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Tho telephone industry in the United States today faces 
tho task of meeting the needs for growth and technological 
improvement which our growing economy places before it . There 
is a constant need for growth capital, and a constant need for 
cooperation between company management and L'egula tory groups to 
see that the needs of the American public are adequately served. 
11his thesis is a bout the economic environment within 
vthich the industry opera tea, and about the legal framework 
within which the regula tory groups must vrork. It is critical 
of environment, and critical of the legal framework . There is 
no criticism of the actions of industry management , or of the 
actions of regulators. 
It is tho autho~ 1 s view that management, in the telephone 
indus t t'Y as woll as others, can be expected to pm•sue the 
interests of their oqui ty holders. 'l'hey do this. It is wor•thy 
of remark that the degree of enlightened self interest is such 
that their actions take into considers tion the welfare of the 
telephone user. They work toVIard a progressive lndustl'Y, tovmrd 
keeping the cost of se1~vice as loVI as possible, toward mooting 
the needs of our growing economy. 1'hoy cannot be expected to 
sac1•ifice the interests of their equity holders in support of 





the telephone user short of such sacrifice. 
The regulators operate withln tho legal framework which 
is set before them. 'l'hey do not make law, they apply it. · 
'I' hey are neither amenable to bribes, nor hostile to the inter-
ests or the corporations. Hegulators act for the public. 
Their actions are, in large 'measure, controlled by a framework 
made of le gislation and precedent. 
I. THE METHOD 
The direction which the thesis is to take, if knovm in 
advance, should make the path easier fot• the reader. The 
history of the telephone industry and the history of rate making 
bodies will be discussed first. The various aspeots of regula-
tory action and of economic conditions insofar as they affect 
the industry will be discussed next . '!'he final chapter will 
briefly summarize the more important aspects of the problems 
posed for the companies and the regulators alike, by economio 
conditions outside the control of eaoh group and by the legis-
lative framework within whioh the regulatory groups operate, 
insofar as such framework poses problems today for both the 
companies and the regulators. 
I CHAPTErl II 
HIS'l'OHICAIJ DL VELOPM8N"£ 
It is necessary to tell of the beginnings of the 
telephone industry, for the interpttetation of all which 
follows is dependent upon a co~non understanding concerning 
the origin, development, and the current structure. This 
understanding must also cover the financial position of the 
industry, tho relationship between the industry and modern 
society, and must touch on certain technological developments. 
Modern society is dependent upon rapid communications. 
As time passes , we become more dependent. The more advanced 
an economy, the more interdependent are all aspects of its 
malreup. Economic growth in the United States is inextricably 
bound to communications. The trend ·toward bigness, automation , 
and electronic business methods make it mandato1•y that commu .. 
nications keep pa ce with industrial development. 
I. PN£ENT MONOPOLY 
The telephone industry had ita boginning in the inven-
tion of the telephone by Alexander Graham 13ell. On I•'ebrua ry 
27, 1875 , prior to the invention of the telephone, Bell entered 
into an agreement w1 th nardiner G. Hubbard and r.rhomae Sanders, 
v1herein Hubbard and Sanders would each furnish half of the 
capital necessary to perfect and obtain patents on a harmonic 
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telegraph system which Bell was developing. IJ.'he three agreed 
to share equally in all patents Bell might obtain. It is 
interesting to note that a two-thirds interest in the tele• 
phone was sold by Bell at this time, even though it had not 
been invented. 
Bell was attempting to work out a practical method of 
originating electrical waveforms of constant frequency Vlhich 
could be transmitted over wires when, as reports tell us, he 
spilled battery acid and then shouted, "Mr. Watson, come here, 
I want you." Watson heard the sounds repeated over the 
instruments with which they were experimenting. Thus the 
telephone was discovered, rather than invented. I do not 
describe the preceding to detract from Mr. Bell's contribution. 
There is nothing I could say which could detract. I mention 
the preceding because the telephone industry had its beginning 
in patent monopoly. Discoveries are f requently as patentable 
as inventions. 
In examining the early histo~ical background of the 
indust1•y the patents are important. They were the foundation. 
They were the beginning. However, they are no longer of such 
importance !'or the telephone i.ndustry in the United States no 
longer has any important factor of patent monopoly pr•oteotion. 
Four patents were issued in 1876 and 1877 as a result of 
Bell's partnership with Hubbard and Sanders. Two were on the 
telephone, and two on the telegraph system. The telephone 
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patents were titled, "An Improvement in Telegraphy." Hubbard 
was assigned all four patents as trustee for the Bell Tele-
phone System. !l.l'rangements were completed and the Bell 
Telephone Company, a voluntary association for the purpose of 
commercial development was formed on the 9th of July, 1877 . 
The Declaration of Trust which covered Hubbard's trusteeship 
divided the ownership of the patents into 5000 shares. A few 
days later, on July 11th, Boll married Mabel G. Hubbard, 
daughter of Gardiner C. Hubbard, and assigned the majority of 
his holdings to her. 
It is worthy to note that Bell released a two-thirds 
interest in the telephone before it was invented, and tur•ned 
over control of patents on the telephone before any instruments 
were in service. 
Shares under the patents were divided as indicated in 
Table I on page 6. 
In 1878 two companies were formed to promote telephone 
development. They were the New England Telephone Company, 
covering development in the Nell England states, and the Bell 
Telephone Company in Massachusetts, handling development in 
the rest of the United States. In 1879 these two companies 
assigned their interest in two of the four Bell patents to the 
National Bell 'l1olephone Company, incot•porated in February of 




DIVISION o:F' BELL' S PA'rl!."'N'r S 
Thomas Sanders 1497 shares 
Mabel G. Bell 1497 oharea 
Gardiner c. Hubbard 1387 shares 
Thomas Watson 499 shares 
Mrs. Gertrude Hub ba rd 100 shares 
Chnrle s E. Hubbard 10 shares 
Alexander G. Bell 10 shares 
Total 5000 shares 
l 
l 
Local telephone companies were formed thl,oughout the 
United States in the period until April of 1880. These were 
7 
independent companies which leased their telephone instruments 
from the National Bell Telephone Company or who relied on 
patent applications submitted by others. By 1879 licenses had 
been granted to 185 local telephone companies throughout the 
United States. Many permanent license contracts were entered 
into wherein the Bell Company received an int erest amounting 
to 35 per cent of the licensees stook. 1 
Through 1879 there was considerable competition between 
the Western Union 'l'e legraph Company and the National Bell 
'l'elephone Company . In late 1879 the two companies reached an 
agreement whereby Bell Telephone would not enter the telegraph 
business , and V'Jestern Union would do no telephone business . 
Following this agreement, the National Bell Telephone Company 
'Uas reorganized in April of 1880 to become the American Bell 
Telephone Company . A point worthy of note here is that the 
American Bell Telophone Company included in its corporate 
charter the authority to own stock in other companies. Prior 
to this t1me , each operating company was independent of tho 
Bell system. There was no holding company aspect in the tole~ 
phone business. 
1Nat1onal Association of Railroad and Utility Commis-
sioners, Messafe Toll Tele¥hone Rates and Disparities (Washington: 
National Aasoc atron-or Ra lroad and utflity Commisloners , 1951), 
p . 9. 
l 
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II. GHOVJ'l'H UNDER PA'l'EN'l' MONOPOLY 
A typical example of the importance of the elimi nation 
of the Western Union Telegraph Company from the telephone 
field, the establishment of a patent monopoly, and the holding 
company position of the AmeJI'ioan Bell Telephone Company can be 
seen in the background of The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, which operates in Calif ornia, Oregon, Washington, 
and part of Idaho, also owning the Bell Telephone Company of 
Nevada as a wholly owned subaidiary. 
The Gold Stock Telegraph Company organized the American 
Speaking 'l'elephone Company wli\ich opened its telephone exchange 
in San Francisco on February 17th, 1878. This was less than a 
year after the opening of the first experiment1;1l. switchboard 
exchange, which '1ent into service in May of 1877 on the east 
coast. The Gold Stock Telegraph Company began operations on 
the basis of patent applications made by Amos Dolbeer, Thomas 
Edison, and Elisha Gray. These were quite independent of 
Boll's patents. The company was a subsidiary of Western Union. 
The 1879 agreement between National Bell and Western Union 
allowed National Bell to buy all of the telephone properties of 
the Gold Stock Company. Another stipulation of the agreement 
was the t the Bell Company pay Western Union a 20 per cent 
royalty on all telephone instrument leases for the life of the 
original patents, 17 years. During that period, Western Union 
was to pay 20 per cent of tho development costs of any new 
patents developed or acquired by the Bell system and was to 
receive 20 per cent of the royalties or rentals . 
9 
BetVIeen 1877 and 1893 over 600 infringement suits were 
brought by the Bell system. Most suits involved tho dafand-
ants withdrawing from the business. :f!'ive of the so suits 
reached the Supreme Court, where Be 11' s patents were upheld 
in their entirety. 
,. 
Figure 1, page 10, shows, in brief i'o~m, the develop-. 
ment of The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company of today 
from the telephone interests of the Western Union, the Gold 
Stock Telegraph Company. 
Figure 1 shov1s all major acquisitions through 1917, 
when Sunset ~!elephone and Telegraph Company became Pacific 
Telephone and Telegraph property . Since 1917 there have been 
fevt major changes. These consisted of i.ncorporating the sub-
sidiary holdings of the Pacific company into the company 
proper , rather than maintaining them in subsidiary status. 
The chart is reproduced here because it is rather 
typical of the development of American Telephone and Telegraph 
subsidiaries, the operating companies or the Bell system. 
The American Bell Telephone Company, which took over 
control of the telephone interests or the Gold Stock Telegraph 
Company from the Western Union in 1880 was considerably larger 
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greater capitalization. The ovmership VIaS more widespread. 
All interests of the National Bell Telephone Company, and all 
interests in Bell Telephone patents Vlhich had been held by 
individuals were taken over by the American Bell Telephone 
Company. This company is the true parent of today ' a American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company. 
F'ollowing this start, the organization of the American 
Bell Telophone Company, the telephone industry went through a 
period of tremendous growth . The Bell system made the greatest 
gains . These wez'e accomplished in the earlier yeat•s through 
the advantages of patent monopoly, starting with Bell's 
original tvto patents , and later continuing through the Blake 
transmitter, open wire transposition systems, common battery 
switchboards, loading coils, telephone repea tars, and other 
inventions which the Bell system developed and patented, or 
upon v1hich they purchased assignments of patent rights. 
As the original and fundamental telephone patents 
expired in 1893 and 1894, a great many independent telephone 
companies came into existence. Some Vlere in small communities 
previously v1i thout telephone service. Others Vlere formed :tn 
larger oi ties in competition v1i th Bell system companies. In 
some oases the independents outdistanced the Bell companies to 
become the only operating company in the area. Independent 
manufacturers of telephone equipment came into being to supply 
apparatus and in some casoa to assist in financing and promoting 
tho independents . 
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III. HI SJ<; OF 'l'HE HOLDI NG COMPANY 
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company, as 
organized in 1885, included in its corporate charter the 
:r•ight to hold a took in other companies. The primary function 
of the American company at that time was as a long-distance 
ope rating company. The role of holding company, parent or 
the Bell system, began to appear as the company's important 
function at the turn of the century. 
During the two decades follov1ing the expiration of the 
basic patents, there wns a serious attempt made by the Bell 
System to extend Bell service into as many areas as possible. 
At the clooe of 1902 there were 1,317,178 Bell-ovmed and 
1,053,866 independent telephones in the United State s . The 
rate of growth was held open to question in many aspects dur ing 
this period, even though by 1915 the Bell system had only 5300 
telephone exchanges out of a total of 21,300 in existence. 
Today the Bell system has about 43 pe r cent of the country's 
telephone exchanges. The larger exchanges serving the urban 
areas were and are principally, though not v.rholly, owned by tho 
Bell system. 
I n 1910 the Mann-Elkins Ac t made most telephone companies 
subject to regulation by the Inter•stato Commerce Commission, 
As an outgrowth o!' this le gislation, and of complaint s by the 
independent telephone companies, the Attorney General' s of f ice 
• 
advised The American •relephone and •.relcgraph Company that 
further expansion might make them subject to prosecution 
13 
under anti-trust laws. In response to this, in December of 
1913, Nathan c. Kingsbury, a vice-president of The A. T . & T. 
Company, in correspondence with the .Attorney General committed 
the Hell system to provide long-distance connections for 
independent telephone companies. Bell further agreed not to 
purchase any more independent companies except as approved by 
the Interstate Co~neroe Commission. This position was later 
~affirmed under the Bell system presidency of Harry B. Thayer 
in the "Hall Memor•andurn." The A. T. & T. assured the United 
States Independent Telephone Association, in defining Bell 
system policy, "Bel l wouldn't take over an independent prop-
erty vii thout giving other independents advance notice; and in 
any event, Bell wouldn ' t buy a telephone property unless it 
logically fitted int o nearby Bell facilities and the purchase 
was clearly in the public interest •••• 112 
This is still the policy of the Bell system. Tho popu-
lation growth in many areas, and the shifts in population 
following World War II made many opportunities for expansion 
into new territories, and provided many opportunities to absorb 
small independents. Bell, obligated by the "Kings bu1~y Commit-
ment" and the "Hall Memorandum" did not pursue an expansionist 
2illj_., P• 11. 
policy. ~'he General rl'elephone and Electronics Corporation, 
bound by no such agreement, managed a 169 per cent increase 
in telephones within thei:r• sys tern in the 1951-59 pel"iod. 
Bell ' s gain, limited almost wholly to growth within their 
3 
existing operating areas, was about 55 per cent. A g:r•aph in 
tho appendix shows the growth of the Bo 11 ~>ystem from 1895 
through the present day. 
IV. 'I'Illi INDUST HY TODAY 
The telephone industry today consists of the Bell system, 
v1i th approximate 1 y 82 per cent of the nation • s te 1 ephone s , the 
General Telephone and Elect;ronics Corporation with about 6 per 
cent. and the remaining 12 per cent divided among about 3500 
small operating companies. Some of these are independent, some 
are subsidiaries of public utility holding companies such as 
General Water~orks Corporation, United Utilities Corporation, 
Western Utilities Corporation , and others. 
'rhe table on the following page pr•esents the status of 
the lndustry as of the close of 1959. Statistics furnished by 
the General Telephone and Electronics Oorpora tion were used in 
preparing the tables. It should be noted that a number of 
sources are available for such figures, and that the figures 
from the various sources are not in agreement. 
0Hobert Sheehan, "A. T. & T. Meet G. T . & E.," Fortune 
(September , 1959 ), P • 117. 
15 
TABlE II 
DISCHEPANCIES lN SOUHCES 0}' DNrA 
Figures from Figures from 
General u. s. Independent 
Telephone Telephone Assn. 
rrotal Telephones 68,675,000 70,895,000 
Gross tlevenuoa ~( 8,300,000* $ 8,453,368·~ 
Plant Investment ~;.25, goo, ooo~~ $26,478' 066{~ 
~lll'housanda of Dollars 
16 
Examples of the degree of variance between sources can 
bo sean in Table II. Discrepancies of this degree, though 
serious, have not proven a handicap in preparing this work. 
~easons for such discrepancies are primarily in the counting 
method used. One sat of figures will include private line 
telephones, tho other may not. One will include income from 
non-regulated sources, tho other may not. 
Table IV shows the current trends in the telephone 
industx•y. Further materiel pertaining to the present position 
of the telephone industry is included in the first pages of 
the appendix. 
TABU: III 
'l'lo;IEPHOlill S'l'ATIS'l'ICS, AGGHEGATES, 1969 
Tllli TELEPHONE INDUS'rHY AS A WHOLE: 
rrelephones ('l'housands) 
Investment in Plant ( Million~ ) 
Annual Gross Operating Revenues (Million $ ) 
Average Daily Conversations (Thousands ) 
Employees 
'l'HE INDEPENDENT TELEPHONE COMPANIES : 
Telephones (Thousands ) 
Investment in Plant (Million $ ) 
Annual Gross Operating Revenues (Million $ ) 
Avera ge Daily Conversations (Thousands ) 
Employees 
THE GENEHAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM : 
Telephones (Thousands ) 
Investment in Plant (Million ~ ) 
Annual Gross Operating Revenues (Million $ ) 




















'riiD:NDS IN THE INJ)USTHY, 1955-19594 
I N DUST HY AS A WHOLE 
Telephones in service 
Gross Plant Investment 
Gross Revenues 
Number of Employees 
Telephones in service 
Gross Plant Investment 
Gross Revenue 
Number of Employees 
GEREHAL 'l'F.LEPHONE SYSTEM 
Telephones in service 
Gross Plant Investment 
Gross Revenues 














.:~11 large part of this increase is in industt,ial rathe r 
than utility employment. 
4oeneral Telephone and Electronics Corpor•a tion, Financial 
Statistics ~ (Nevi York: General Telephone and Electr•onioa 
Corporation, 1960), p. 20 . 
CliAPTErl III 
HEGULATOHY AG~NCIES 
The material of this chapter, though essential to an 
understanding of the problems dealt with in this study, may 
be found in texts covering the principles of public utility 
economics. The chapter may be omitted by professionals and 
those grounded in the subject. 
Hate regulation ln the telephone industry today is done 
on two bases. Laws relating to interstate commerce have 
brought the regulation of interstate rates under the jurisdic-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The passage of 
the Communications Act of 1934 transferred this jurisdiction 
to the Federal Communications Commission, where it now resides. 
In addition, the industry is regulated as to local service 
charges and intrastate rates by state regulatory agencies . 
These agencies may be called by different names in the var•ious 
states. Every state except Iowa and Texas has a regulatory 
body concerned with the regulation of telephone rates. 
I. HISTOHICAL BACKGHOUND 
It is a natural and reasonable tendency of economic man 
to press his advantage. It is obvious that situations may 
arise wherein the advantage of the few may encroach unduly upon 
the interest of many, of the public at large. A recognition of 
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the need for protection of the public interest can be seen 
throughout history. .F'or our purpose, we are concerned with 
such recognition under law. We trace the beginnings of our 
regula tol•y legal .framework to English Common Law. In English 
Common Law the re is a recognition that certain occupations 
are affected with a public interest. We may trace the origin 
of utility regulation in America to these beginnings. 
From earliest times in America there were attempts to 
. regulate those activities which were generally recognized as 
being affected with a public interest. The effectiveness of 
early attempts is vrell summed up by Professors Thompson and 
Smith of the State University of Iowa in the statement: 
The history of the carriers and regulated occupa tiona 
certainly suggests that public authorities preferred to 
rely upon the force of competition to secure adequate 
service and reasonable rates. Consequently, there is 
scarcely a trace of effective public utility regulation 
prior to the opening of the War between tho States. 
Attempts at control of industries vested with a public 
interest has developed over many years. The scope and nature 
of this development is well defined by Professors Thompson and 
Smith: 
The legal basis of regulation rests on the police power. 
That power may be invoked to limit the rights of property 
in the interest of what the courts regard as public health, 
public morals, public safety, and general welfare. • • The 
1c. w. Thompson and w. R. Smith, Public Utility Economics 
(New. York: McG1•aw-H111 Book Company, 1941), pp. 151-52. 
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moat effective agencies thus far created are the state 
commissions with statewide jurisdiction to handle state 
and local problems and federal commissions to deal with 
national utility problems. The powers of a commission are 
specifically given to it by its creator, the legislature 
or the Congress . Because of this source of authority, a 
commission can do only those things which its legislative 
grant of power specifically permits or which can be 
r•easonably interpreted a\S necessarily flowing out of tho 
grant ••• (however) ••• the courts, not the legislatures, 
mark the limits of regulation, and today they will review 
any controversy between a utility and its regulating 
agency. All attempts to limit the substantive protection 
of judicial review have been blocked in no uncertai~ 
language by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The tremendous growth of corporations in the United 
States gave rise to the question of whether or not corporations 
enjoyed the same protection under the Constitution as do indi-
viduals. In 1866 Chief Justice Waite of the Supreme Court said, 
Tho court does not wish to hear argument on the question 
whether the provision in the fourteenth amendment to the 
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny protection of 
the laws, applies to ~hese corporations. We are all of the 
opinion that it does. 
Hegulation of industry, where the interest of the general 
public is concerned, is a matter for gover•nment. To examine 
the basis under Vlhich such regulation has been under·taken war-
rants attention. 
With the founding of this nation, we took the background 
of English Common Law, the precedent of court decisions in 
England, as a basis for decision in oases where conflict arose, 
2lJ&9.., p. 132. 
3 .!!>.!.9.. , p • 133 • 
insofar as such cases were not covered specifically under 
constitutional or statutory law. 
Law in the United States may be divided, in a general 
way, into three categories. There is the common laVI, based 
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on precedent and constantly modified as changing circumstances 
make such modification necessary and desirable. This is in 
effect court made law. 'rhe common law in its traditional 
sense has been limited by constitutional law, as the consti-
tutions of the Fe deral and State governments have specified 
rights and limitations of the actions of citizens. 
Common law is further limited by statutory law, passed 
upon by the legislative branches of Federal and State govern-
ments. Statutory law further limits the actions or guarantees 
the rights of the citizens. Thus, law falls into three cate-
gories: constitutional law, statutory law, and common law. 
Constitutional law, of course, takes precedence over 
statutory and common law, and any rights or privileges 
guaranteed under the Constitution cannot be abridged by 
statute, or by common law decision. 
Statutory law limits common law and takes precedence 
over it. 
Decisions made by courts, where neither constitutional 
nor statute law are applicable, are made on the basis of 
common law precedent, where such precedent is found to be 
applicable. When faced with situations where no precedent 
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can bo closely applied, courts must decido a case on the basis 
of its own merits. In so doing they create new precedents, 
or modify old ones. 'rhus the judiciary must make the law , or 
resort to the alternative of refusing to hear the case 1n 
questiono 
Our Feder~l Constitution, and the constitutions of the 
majority of the states, ma·ke no provision for regulation o:f 
utilities, other than in the most general sense, as in Article 
1, Section VIII of the Federal Constitution which grants 
Congress the power to regula te interstate commerce. Common 
laVI, however, offers many in$tances of the regulation of 
certain activities in period s long before the founding of this 
nation. 
'l'he decisions of the :b;nglish courts, wherein such cases 
were originally decided on their ovm merits, hinge, for the 
most part , upon tVJo factors. First, the existence of a vested 
public interest. Second, the existence of a monopoly position, 
usually a natur•al monopoly. Thus the sovereign power of the 
state, and the police pov1er of the state, are the foundations 
for the regulatory activity. 
Ireton H. Barnes, of the Yale University Department of 
Economics has stated, 
The ri8ht of a state to regulate the rates of public 
service companies is inherent in the sovereign povter . 'rhis 
regulation is one of the legislative functions of the state. 
The source of this power is not to be found in any specific 
provision of the Constitution (although it may be expressly 
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mentioned in some state constitutions ): but it may be 
said to como under the police power of the state,--the 
power of the state to legislate in the interests of the 
common welfare . The power to regulate rates may be 
exercised direct l y by the legislature or by some commis-
sion created by an act pf tho legislature; or the legis-
lature may delegate this power to the political subdivi-
sions--as gx•anting cities the power to regulate local 
utilities operating within their confines. The require-
ment that the prescribed rates must not be so low as to 
be confiscatory is the only limitation on the exercise of 
this power by the state. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The question of whether or not the rates so fixed are 
confiscatory is a question for judicial deteiwination; but 
it is no part of the cour t's function to fix the rates to 
be charged . 4 
Hate making or regulatory bodies, for the most part, 
exist under statutory law. 'l'he legislatures of the various 
·states have passed bills creating regulatory agencies, the 
Railroad Commissions, Public Service Commissions, or Publio 
Utilities Commissions of the various states . They have invested 
these commissions with the police power of. the state within 
s uch limits as is outlined in their l egislation. Our Federa l 
Government has done the same in the creation of such bodies as 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications 
Commission , the Securities and Exchange Commission, and others. 
It is to be noted that the legislatures may state thnt 
an industry is a public utility on the basis of an apparent 
vested public interest or natural monopoly. Their so stating 
4Irston R. Barnes , Publio Utility Control In ~achusetts 
(New Haven: Yale University Press , 1930), P• 86 . 
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does not make the industry a utility. Only by decision of 
the judiciary does such an assumption become fact. Purther, 
the regulat ory bodies created by legismture may make deci-
sions, may hand dovm rul!.ngs , within the framework of such 
legislation as governs their actions, hm1ever all such 
decisions and rulings may be made subject to judicial review 
when and if the groups upon which the regulation is brought to 
bea:r• con test the action, and question the legality of the 
rulings of the commissions. Generally the Supreme Court of 
t he State involved, or of the Federal Government x•eview such 
questions of legality . 5 Such questions as arise are frequently 
on the basis of a restriction o·r abridgment of such rights as 
are guaranteed under the Constitution. 
In the case of the telephone industry, such judicial 
review as has taken place in the past several decades has 
centered around the claim, by companies involved, that the 
regula tory body has denied them rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment or I•'ourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Vlherein the 
property of an individual cannot be oonfisca ted without due 
process of laVI. When and if a regula tory agency sots a rate of 
return so low that there is no reasonable return on invested 
capital, the oapi tali zed value of the seouri ties of the f'h•m 
drop, thus the firm and its equity holders are deprived of 
5The appendix contains a list of states, and the courts 
within those states which are authorized to review commission 
rulings. 
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their property . As the legislation regarding public utilities 
does not allow the utility to withdraw from business, or to 
refuse to serve, the effect of unduly low rates is confisca-
'l'hus we see that on the basis of common law, we 
recognize the need to regulate . Through statutory law we 
create the agencies of regulation. Constitutional law is the 
basis on which such regulatlon is most frequently subjected 
I 
to judicial review. 
A great many theories have been advanced over the years 
for determining the existence of a vested public interest. 
Authorities in the public utility field have categorized these 
as legal theories, or as economic theories. The economic 
theories have proved, in the long run, to be the most satis-
factory insofar as understanding the underlying principles are 
concerned. 
II. THEOHU~S AS 1£0 IJ.'.HE BASIS 01-1 THE PUBLIC INTE.ttEs•.r 6 
Two of the earlier legal theories which can be found in 
common law sources are the "Holding Out" theory, which implies 
that where one "holds himself out" to serve the general public 
he is thereby subject to regulation as to charges and the nature 
6Irston H. Barnes, Ec onomics of Public Utility Hegula tion 
(Nevi York: Crofts and Company, 1942}, pp. 13-19. 
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of service, and the "Constructive Grant" theory which implies 
that when one devotes his property to a use in which the public 
has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest 
in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for 
the common good and to the extent of the interest he has thus 
created. These theories have found little application in the 
twentieth centu1~y, and trace their background to a period when 
businesses were looked upon as being either public, or private, 
and when most businesses did not exist to serve the general 
public. 
A recent, but never popular, theory is the "All Inclusive 
Police-Power" theory. By this theory, a state legislature can 
do whatever it sees fit to do unless restrained by some exPressed 
prohibition in the constitution. Under this theory, the power 
to r-egulate is recognized as separate from the employment of' 
property in public use. Such matters as rent control and price 
control can be seen to rest upon such a theory. 
Legal theories having wide application in the present 
day courts are the "Implied Contract11 theory, which shoVJs that 
an implied contract may be assumed to exist when a business 
enjoys special privileges from government--such privileges as 
franchise and eminent domain are typical, and the nGovernmental 
Function" theory which suggests that any business which performs 
what should be a public or governmental .function is an agency 
of the state. 
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The economic theories relative to the basis of deter-
mining public inter•est are the 11 Monopoly11 theory, a ta ting that 
natural monopoly may exist where it is economically unsound 
to duplicate facilities. This theory leaves a void as to 
where regulation should be extended, and the nature of such 
controls as are appropriate. The second economic theory is 
the "Social .Diaadvon tage" theory which s uggesta thn t the 
welfare of society takes precedence over the protection of the 
individual. Where competition cannot protect public welfare, 
controls must substitute for lack of competition. 
III. DE'l'AILS OI<' 'l'.t-lli: HEGULA'rOHY PROCESS 
A definition of the pov1ers and functions of regulatory 
commissions will serve to augment theory as to the basis for 
regulation, and let us see exactly v1hat commission power is, and 
what form commission actions may take. Though commissions are 
extensions of the legislative branch of government, their actions 
are not solely legislative in nature. Their primary function 
is legislative, as when they fix rates, vthich is the duty the 
bodies are primarily created to perform. Their actions become 
judicial in nature when they conduct rate case hearings where 
a conflict of interest exists. Their actions are administrative 
in nature when they proceed to put into effect the decisions of 
the legislature, or their own decisions, once judicial and 
legislative functiots have been performed. 
Commissions possess, to a considerable degre e , such 
povtor as is necessary to carry out their functions. The 
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powers of commissions may be divided into two broad categories, 
ordinarily termed the enabling powers, an d the directing 
powers. The enabling power•s of commissions include the stating 
of such conditions as a utility must meet before it may do such 
things as getting the utility started, undertaking consolida-
tions or mergers of existing companies, or issuing new 
securities. 'rhe directing powers refer to the issuance of 
commission directives which instruct utility management that 
they must meet standards regarding accounting, reporting, and 
depreciation . Directing powers also cover instruction to 
company management by commissioners regarding rate bases, rates, 
service requirements, safety requirements, ond material of • 
similar nature. 
IV. SPJ!;CIFIC POWEHS OF S'l'A'l'E COMMISSIONS 
'l'he legislature of each state delegates certain powers 
to the sta t e commission. Such powers as are granted vary from 
state to state. In the appendix there is a chart showing each 
state, the number and method of appointment of the commissioners, 
and the extent of commission jurisdiction. 'l'he powers menti oned 
are not exercised on a continuous basis in any case, but only 
as the need arises. The geneT'al nature of such power•s as are 
of principal concern to moat commissions are as i'ollows: 7 
HA'lES : The commission can determine, under• law, the 
reaaona'6lonesa of the rates charged by the utility which 
are either proposed, or which are in effect and have 
been questioned. 
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SERVICE S'rANDAHDS : lBy issuing so -called "certificates 
of convcmienoe and nooessi ty," the commia sion virtually 
lays out the area bounduries and other service oondi tiona 
within which a utility proposes or may be required to 
servo. ~his may include approval of any substantial 
service expansion or curtailment of existing services, or 
service discontinuance. 
ACCOUN'l'ING AND HEPORTING: Tho commiasior1s have gener-
ally adopted·'uniform systems of accounts for the various 
types of utilities which they regulate. Such accounting 
or bookkeeping records are subject to continuous check, 
and the commissions may require that entries or changes 
be made regarding certain accounts or items, including 
operating expenses and capital plant investment. An 
important part of this bookkeeping control includes the 
establishment of the depreciation method to be used. In 
addition to uniform accounting, commissions may and often 
do require that the utilities keep what is known a s continu-
ous property records, regular, (at least onoe a year) and 
special reports may be required, including balance sheet 
reports, budget estimates on new construction, etc., or 
some othe r phase of operations, (subject to the commission's 
control) on which it may require information, such as 
service performance, safety inspection, etc. 
Sl!!CUHl'l'Y ISSUES: Applies tiona for proposed issues may 
be examined and subjected to commission approval before they 
can be authorized. As part of this author1 ty, any plans 
for financial reorganization of autility are uoually subject 
to commission approval, where it has authority to approve 
security issues. 
PROPEHTY CHANGES: The proposed purchase, sale, or majo1• 
alteration-or status of any substantial portion of utility 
property may be subject to commission examination and 
approval. This is a check on the utility's continued 
ability to render adequate service to the public. 
CORPORATE RELATIONS: Any consolidation or merger, or 
other alteration of the status of a regulated utility company 
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which might result in changing its corporate control, may 
be subject to commission approval. ~his is to insure the 
continuation of responsible management. This regulatory 
power also includes the regulation of the relations ana 
transactions between the regulated public utilities ana 
other companies with v1hioh it may be a1'filiatea. 'l•hus, 
all contracts for service or supplies, leases, property 
sales, and other arrang~ments between companies which 
have some corporate relationship with each other, may be 
subject to examination and approval. 
PROCEDURES: The commissions can make their ovm rules 
and regulations for carrying out the exercise of all the 
foregoing powers and for conducting incidental procedures 
for specific purposes. This would include such matters as 
investigations, complaints, hearings, inspections, etc. 
V. LIMITATION'S OF• COMMISBIONS8 
Utility ra te oases often must go to the courts for 
1 decision as to what is the function of management and what is 
the authority of the commission . No two oases are exactly 
alike in all details, and ea ch case may have to be decided on 
its own circumstances. We do have enough decisions from the 
courts to give at least a partial list of things which the 
commissions have no authority to do. For example, the commie-
sions cannot: 
1. Fix prices to be paid by a public utility for 
things, such as supplies and equipment which the 
utility uses in its operations. 
2. Specify the manufacture or quality of equipment 
to ba used by a utility, as long as operations 
conform to reasonable standards of safe and ade-
quate service it is not the responsibility of tho 
commission to decide what kind of equipment is 
8 Ibid., No. 29, P• 2. -
l 
used, or what methoqs o1' operation are followed. 
3. Dictate the terms of contracts between utilities 
in their relation to other companies supplying 
them with goods, properties, or sundries used in 
utility operations. 
4. Dictate the physical location of offices, plants. 
6. Pass on wages, s$laries, or other employment 
practices. 
11he organizational arrangements of the various state 
commissions vary from one state to another; however thore is 
a striking similarity in the organizational structure. A 
32 
chart is included in the appendix which shows the organization 




COMPL~XI'£IES AND NON -U.Nif'ORMI'l'Y 
IN HEGULA'l' OHY PxU\.C'l' ICE 
The preceding chapter, which tells of the historical 
development of l'ate making bodies, makes it clear that they 
are autonomous bodies, one from the other. Each operates 
within a legal fl"'amework set forth by the legislature of the 
particular state. The differences which exist from one state 
to another can be seen, in part, in the charts which appear 
in the appendix. The actual differences between the actions 
of the various state bodies is in many cases greater than 
these charts indicate. It is the purpose of this chapter to 
show the complex! ties vthich exist and the lack of a uniform 
pattern in rate setting processes. 
The rate making process consists of establishing the 
value of plant, then establishing a fair return on this value. 
To this , is added tho reasonable and legitimate operating 
costs involved in providing the service. On the face of it , 
this is a straightforward process. In actuality it becomes far 
more complex. 
I. P HOBLEMS IN HATE BASE I•;STABLISHMgN'l' 
No investigation into the development of rate base 
establishment can be complete without citing the Smyth v . Ames 
-1 
case in which Mr. Justice Harlan , speaking for the Supreme 
Court,1 stated that to ascertain value, consideration must 
be given to original oostp amount expended on permanent 
improvements, amount and market value of stocks and bonds, 
present as compared with original cost of construction, 
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probable earning capacity of the property under particular 
rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet 
operating expenses. These matters were all to be considered, 
and were "to be given such weight as may be just and r ight in 
ea ch case."2 Eli w. Clemens, in "Economics of Public Util i -
ties" states that "On the equivocal issue of value, the cour .. t 
took a firm and uncompromising fence-straddling position."3 
In the years since the Smyth v. Ames case, since 1898, 
many of the six criteria listed by Justice Harlan have been 
neglec ·lie cl by rate base establishing gr•oups . The original cost, 
the permanent improvements, the present value have most fre-
quently been used. Many modifications in the Smyth v. Ames 
concepts have taken place over the years, as a result of 
judicial review resulting from rate cases. 
lThompson and Smith, 2£• cit., P• 280. Barnes , Q£• 
cit., pp . 374-378. Eli W. Clemeii'S;" Economics and Public 
utilities (New York: f\ppleton Century Crofts, 1'950), PP• 371-78. 
2Thompson and Smith, .2l?.• ill••P• 280. 
3clemens, ~· £!!., p. 140. 
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The Knoxville Water Company case in 1909 added depre-
ciation to the list of i terns which deserve considers tion. 
The Consolidated Gas Case in 1909 added franchise value and 
the significance of a general rise in price level. The 
Minnesota rate cases of 1913 brought increases in land value 
into consideration. rrhe Galveston Electric Company case 
included income tax as a cost of operation, added "going con-
cern value (is) ••• not to be included in the rate base for 
the purpose of determining whether a rate is confiscatory." 
The Southwestern Bell Case, termed by Eli w. Clemens4 
as "valuation by confusion" brought a statement by Justice 
Brandeis of the Supreme Court , "The so-called rule of Smyth 
v. Ames is, in my opinion, legally and economically unsound. 
The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not 
specific property, tangible and intangible, but capital 
embarked in the enterprise. Upon the cnpital so invested, 
the Federa l Constitution guarantees to the utility the oppor-
tun1 ty to earn a fair return ." This was not a part of the 
court decision, but was a minority dissenting opinion offered 
by Justice Brandeis. 
Thus the accuracy and justice of any and every method 
of rate base determination has been held open to criticism and 
conjecture. On January 3rd, 1944, the U. s. Supreme Court 
4Clemena, .2£• ill.., p. 147. 
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handed down a decision in the Federal Power Commission v. 
Hope Natural Gas Company case which has tended to push the 
Smyth v. Amos concepts, with all their modification over the 
years, into the background. 
Justice Douglas said, in delivering the opinion of the 
Supreme Court: 
Hates which enable the company to operate successfully, 
to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, 
and to compensate its lnvestors for the risks assumed 
certainly cannot be con~emned as invalid, even though they 
might produce onl! a meager return on the so-called ~fair 
value" rate base. 
'!'he results of the Hope case made allegiance to the 
present fair value interpretation of the Smyth v. Ames rule 
unnecessary. It placed the test of fairness squarely in the 
effect upon the position of the equity holder, by stating, 
When the commission 's order ••• viewed in its entirety 
• • . meets the requirements of. • • {being ). • • just and 
reasonable; it is the result t•eached not the method employed 
which is controlling ••• it is not the theory but the impact 
of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the 
rate order cannot be said to be unjust and u~reasonable, 
judicial inquiry under the aot is at an end . 
The immediate effoot of the Hope case was to allow, even 
to suggest, that state commissions turn to a depreciated 
original cost rate base, if i'or no other reason than that the 
directness and silnplici ty such a rate base allows could no 
5 Hermnn IJ.'rachsel, Public Utiltl- t.z He aula tion {Chicago: 
1tichard D. Irwin, Inc., 1947), p. 85 . 
6clemens, 2£• £!i., P • 150. 
longer be questioned through rei'erence to Smyth v. Ames, or 
the subsequent cases which considered other factors. 
One of the points at issue in the Hope case VIBS that 
the company was attempting to include the cost of drilling 
and developing new sources <1>f gas, a cost of ~~17, 000,000 in 
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its rate base, as this was a portion of the fair value of theiz• 
plant. The sum was a ctually paid out of gross income as an 
operating cost and therefore did not represent new investment. 
The question was not vthether the value was present in the 
plant, but that the value did not represent a capital invest-
ment which must be paid for ma a cost-of-capital expenditure . 7 
Following the Hope Natural Gas case , many state regula-
tory bodies chose to interpret this decision as a blanket 
approval of the original cost method of determining the rate 
base. At one time only seven states, Arizona, Maryland, 
Montana , New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania , and Texas continued to 
consider current value of property in establishing a rate base. 8 
The inflation which has taken place since the end of 
World War II, causing higher costs of new plant, and thus :r•ising 
values of old plant has done much toward causing regula tory 
7Trachsel, £2• £!i . , pp. 257-258. 
80hio Boll Telephone Company, "Vlhy Ohio ' a Present Hegula-
tory Law Should be Heto.ined , " February, 1959. Appendix II. 
(Mimeographed ) 
-~ 
groups to re-examine the original oost concept. Still, the 
regula tory bodies must wo1•k within the framework of the law 
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as it exists. Some a ta tes have swung away from ·che or•iginal 
cost doctrine. Others have accomplished the same end by 
other means. 'rhe Californta Public Utili ties Connnission has 
taken the stand, uLet the rates reflect the times." 'l'hey hold 
solidly to depreciated original cost as a rate base, but allow 
an increased rate of return on that base, reflecting recog-
nition of the need for increased earnings to compensate for 
the effects of inflation. 
II. METHODS 01<' HAtE BASE DETEHUINA'l'ION 
In most states the law reads that the rates charged fo1• 
service by the company must be just and reasonable. In some 
states the law goes further, by stating that a just and reason-
able rate allows a fair return on fair value of property used 
and useful in providing the service. It become.s more difficult 
to establish the exact method of determining what is fair 
value as we look at the specific wording applicable in each 
area . 
On the following pages is a list of states, showing the 
method of rate base determination given greatest weight or 
preference by each state regulatory commission. In some 
instances the terms used define small differences in meaning. 
.r· 
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Prudent investment, used in defining a r a te base, 
refers to those areas in which the law, o:c• rulings of the 
courts, state that the value of a public utility property 
"shall be the money honestly and prudently invested therein." 
North Dakota's statut e , of 19451 uses theso words. Massachu-
setts was the first prudent investment state. 
Original cost, as a rate base, indicates those states 
which place almost the total weight on book value. 'rhoy may 
disallow impt•udent investments, but the method of determina-
tion is done on an original cost basis, with the examination 
of prudence of investment a secondary factor . 
The states whioh a:t•e classified as "Fair Value" states 
set fair value as a standard without offering definition as 
to criteria for determining fair value, weight given each 
factor , or listing what factors are to be considered. 
The 11 Al l Elements Considered" areas indicate that all 
factors; original cost, prudent investment, reproduction cost 
of plant, and reppoduotion cost of service, are considered. 
They do not, in any case, set a weighting standard for the 
amount of consideration to be given each fa ctor. 
Ohio alone has adopted a "Reproduction Cost New" stand-
ard, stating, "The cost of new production as of date certain, 
of all physical properties other than land, owned and used ••• " 
State Commissions vary widely in their methods of 
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Accrued depreciation determined 
by various methods. 
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TABLB V (con t inued) 
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No method prescribed 
Accrued depreciation dete rmined 
by various methods. 
Observed depreciation or depr e-
ciation reserve deducted. 
1 
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Vlhat methods are used. Eli. Clemens states, "'rhe California 
Commission has consis tently used the prudent investment basis 
• • .'l'he Wisconsin Commission . • • book value. • • reil.ecting 
Ol1iginal cost . 'l1he Massachusetts Commission has used prudent 
investment. • .'rhe Oregon Commis aion has favored original 
II lQ 
cost ••• The Connecticut Commission has considered fair value. 
Suprisingly, the commissions themselves are not in 
agreement with authors of public utility texts. 'l'he Colifo1•nin 
Commission claims o:rigi.nal cost depreciated as ita base. 
Wisconsin states prudent inves t ment to be their prime cri-
terion. Connecticut claims original cost is their prime con-
11 
sideration. 
The pre ceding t able is based upon the legal fromev10rk 
within which t he commissions of the states operate . Many of 
the states which must be classified as to original coat or 
prudent investment areas have taken f air value into considera-
tion to some degree in many of their recent decisions. The 
list of states whi ch to some degree consider fair value at the 
present time includes Ala barns, Arizona, Delaware, Illlnois , 
Indiana, Iowa , Maryl and, Minnesot a , Mi ssouri , Montana, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
1°clemena , ££• ~., pp . 158-159 . 
11Federal Power Commission , ££• £!1. , PP• 8-9. 
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The state commissions, therefore, are tending to look 
to the effects of inflation, and to make some allowance for 
it. The methods used in the various states are as follows: 
Current value of property based upon replacement cost 
nov1: Ohio. 
Current value of property via "fair value" estimates: 
Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Car olina, Pennsylvania. 
End of period rate bnse. (Net investment at end of a 
test period rather than average net investment for the test 
period used): Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nev1 l~exico, North Carolina, Hhode 
Island, Vir ginia • 
.F'uture Period nate Base, (Estimated investment at end of' 
a future period rather than avera ge net investment over a past 
period used in determining the base.): Utah, District of 
Columbia, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Wyoming . 
Increase in rate of return, (Original cost or pr udent 
investment base retained, but additional rate of ro'tuPn allowed, 
compensating for inflationary factors.): California, Florida, 
Idaho, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia. 12 
12why Ohio's 1Wgul atory Law Should Be Ho t a ine d , S?.E.• £ii., 




III. 1'.REND rro A Nb'W STANDA1W 
Thus, in spite of the precedent making decision of the 
Hope Natural Gas case, about 33 states are now considering 
factors other than original coat depreciated in establishing 
the rate base for telephone company ra to regulation. 1'hough 
the method used varies from a ~ ea to aroa, and though in some 
areas the method borders on subterfuge , the fact remains that 
r egula tory bodies are coming to recognize the need i'or a consid -
eration of factors other than prudent investment, or depreci-
ated or iginal coat, which the Hope case in 1944 tended to 
indicate as the standard. 
Certain tests as to the reasonableness of rates have 
been developed over the years, as a result of regulatory 
experience and judiciar•y reviev1 . A list of such tests is 
included in the appendix , along with graphs showing the effects 
of operating companies pur suing their monopoly advantage or 
managing rates foz• community benefit. 
IV. EXA MPLl•;S O.B' NON-UN I P OHMI'l' Y 
The regulatory bodies of the various states lack uni-
formity of oper ation. Examples of this can be sean in examining 
re cent decis i ons of these agencies. 
The New Jersey Commission, in a decision dealing with 
rate base establishment for a water utility, r ejected valuation 
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based on company estimates of reproduction cost, stating, 
11 'l1he use of such fi gures are not justified for items tha t no 
one would want to repr oduce.1113 This ruling runs contrary 
to the reproduction coat of plant concept, which is intended 
to preserve the purchasing pov1er value of the equity holde r s 
investment. It oonoei vably may be in keeping vti th the rep r o-
duction cost of service concept, however reproduction cost of 
service only maintains service capability of plant. In some 
oases it will not preserve purchasing power value of equity 
investments, where future earnings are based on original cost 
depreciated. This points out a weakness in the I'eproduc-tion 
cost o!' service concept. Where the a qui ty holder is not 
allowed an oppot•tuni ty to profit , beyond current-cost-of-
capita l concept s, he should be guaranteed against the possi-
bility ot loss in like degree. 
The United States Supreme Court, in McC ardle v. Indian-
apolis Water Co., 1926 , stated: 
There is to be ascertained the value of the plant used 
to give the service and not the estimated cost of a 
different plant. Save under exceptional circumstances, the 
court is not required to enter upon a comparison of the 
merits of different systems . Such an inquiry would lead to 
collateral is sues and investigations having only remote 
bearing on the fact to be found, viz. the value of the 
property devotod to the service of the public.l4 
13Laurel Springs Water Works Co. Docket No. 603 . 324, 
July 14 , 1960, as reported in Public Utilities Fortnightly , V 66, 
N 6, Sept. 1, 1960, P• 352 . 
14Traohsel, 2£• £11., P • 262. 
l 
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Thus, in spite of a previous United States Supreme 
Court decision voicing opinion to the contrary, the New 
Jer sey Commission ruled, in effect, that reproduction cost 
would only be considered when applied to such plant equipment 
as it would be de s irable to r eproduce. Though this is a 
reasonable view , the que s tion of preservation of' the equity 
holders interest still remains. 
The utilit ies involved in these cases were not telephone 
companies, however, the viewpoints held by member s of given 
commissions in r egard to the proper method of rate base 
establishment a r e common to ~11 utilities within that com-
mission's jurisdiction. 
'l'ur•ning to the matte r of the rate of retu-c·n 1 many 
writers in the public utility field express the view that the 
concern of commissions either should be, or is, fair r eturn on 
fair value. hxamination of' t he record of the various commis-
sions over the years seems to indicate that they ar e concerned 
with the lowest possible rate to t he consumers of the service, 
while allowing such a return as will enable the utility to 
continue operations and attract new capital when and if neces-
sary. Thus, the investors' position per se is not considered. 
Return on investment is given consideration only whe r e a 
deteriorat i on of such investment may pr esent a hazard to 
future service. 
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In recent decades, many commissions have come to 
consider the debt ratio of a utility in determining the cost 
of capital nnd the rate of return. Earl A. Spiller , Jr., 
a writer on Public Utility Accounting, expresses it thus: 
The presence of senior securities on the equity side 
of a firm's position statement does affect the measure-
ment in current dollars of the rate base--the investment 
upon which the utility is allowed to earn a return. rl'he 
rate of return applied to the rate base is frequently an 
average of the capital costs of each of the various kinds 
of capital in the rate base (bonds, preferred stocks, and 
connnon stocks) weighted by the respective amounts of each. 15 
In connection with this statement, let us consider 
brief excerpts from recent commission rulings: 
"The cost of money is not synonymous with the rate of 
return." This wes the Indiana Commission ' s view regarding 
General Telephone of Indiana, Case No. 28196, May 27, 1960. 16 
"A utility is entitled only to that return on its inves t -
ment which will keep whole the investment and will induce 
investors to place cap! tal at the disposal of the industry" 
was the view of the Georgia Commission in the Atlanta Gas Light 
Company hearing, file 19367, Docket 14800, May 31, 1960.17 
15Earl A. Spiller•, Jr., "Common Dollar Accounting and 
the Rate Base," Public Utilities Fortnightll, September 29, 1960, 
p. 438. 
16 "He view of Current Cases," Public Utili ties Ii'ortnightly, 
September 1 , 1960, pp. 349-350. 
17~., P• 349. 
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In Montana, The General 11elephone Company of the 
Northwest v1as involved in a rate hearing, oommiasion Docket 
No. 4855, Order No. 2825, May 31, 1960 , in which the Montuna 
Commission determined that Goneral Telephone and Electronics, 
pal"'ent company of General Telephone of the Northwest , paid a 
4.45 per cent divident on average market price , and that their 
ratio of dividends paid to r•einvested earnings was 80 per cent. 
The comntission als o considered the company ' s 60 per cent debt 
ratio, and granted a cost of money rate of return to the sub-
sidiary, based on the parent company ' s cost of capital . The 
only additional allowance made, above the cost of capital was 
in assuming a 55 per cant debt ratio, rather than the 60 per 
cent which existed . 18 
In Illinois, during tho same period, the Supremo Court 
of Illinois allowed a 5 . 85 per cent return, where 5.44 per cent 
was computed by the commission as the cost of capita1.19 
In Indiana, General Telephone attempted to show noed for 
an 8 per cent return on plant value as cost o!' cap1 tal. This 
would allow a 12 per cent return on equity. The company asked 
for a 6.7 per cent return on the basis of these figures. They 
were granted rate increaoes allowing a 6 per cent return on 
18Ibid., September 29, 1960, pp. 491-492. -
19!2!£. , pp. 500-501. 
total plant investment . The parent company is, or course, 
the same as cited in the Montana case , above.2° 
The North Carolina Telephone Company, in a hearing 
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classified as Docket No. P-70 , Sub 30, August lOth, 1960, 
showed they were covering t heir fi xed charges, (bond interest) 
1 .36 times , and earning only 2 . 46 per cent on common equity . 
They VIera unable to get capital , even v1hen trying to sell 
s ·tock at just over book value. The commission granted an 
increase v1hich vrould cover the debt requirement 1 . 63 time a, 
and give a 4 . 64 per cent return on equity. 21 
'!'he commissions suggest that a high debt ratio is 
looked upon fa vor•a bly in rate increase hearings . The Spring 
Valley Telephone Company, Inc., in October of 1960, re cei ved 
a rate increase to yield 3 .8 per cent on net investment. The 
company' a capi talizat lon was ~; 17, 206 common equity, and 
~;.227,000 debt. This 3.8 per cent re turn meant 23.4 per cent 
earnings on common equity. The Wisconsin Commission stipulated 
that no dividend in excess of 6 pel' cen t might be paid, until 
the debt ratio was brought dovm to 60 per cent debt, 40 per 
cent equity.22 
20~., September 1, 1960, p. 351. 
21rbid., p . 352. 
22" Progt•ess of Hegulation," Public Utilities Port nightly, 




This indicates that Wisconsin views debt in e xcess of 
60 per cent as improper. Most commissions have offered no 
decisions establishing any debt ratio as proper, although 
Wisconsin is not alone in decisions which indicate thinking 
in this direction. 
V. VIEWS ON 1'HE DESIHABII.ITY OF UNIPOHMI1'Y 
All of the pi' eceding information, indicating the 
thinking of the commissioners in the v arious ar•eas, only 
serves to point out that common directions exist, but there 
is no uniform pattern of operation . It would be a far more 
satisfactory appi•oach to understanding the views and the 
operations of each of t he state c ommissions if they made 
definite committal statements as to ends, means, and methode . 
'rhey do not do so. The only way we may knoVI them is by the 
record . It is probably prudent of them to act in this fashion, 
for in reality each case must be heard on its ovm mer1 ts , and 
decided on the basis of the legal framework, which varies from 
state to state, and the commonly stated purposes, low cost 
service without confiscation of utility property. 
'l'ho rates of retur•n commonly allowed, which seldom 
exceed 7·li per cent on the rate base, have differing signifi-
canoe in differing situations. It should be noted the t the 
1•ate bases varies c onsider·ably from depreoia ted book value of 
plant , offered in the appendix t o this work. The depreciated 
book value of plant can be computed from annual reports of 
-, 
51 
the companies. The rE\ te base cannot. Book value is of 
importance from t he investors point of view. It i s of lesser 
si gnificance to the commissions. The reasons for this veri-
ation come about from the method of r a te base establishment, 
whether depreciated or i ginal cost, prudent investment, fair 
value, replacement cost of plant, replacement cost of service, 
or whatever criteria or combination of criteria the particular 
commission uses for determination. 
Tho California Commission, for example, makes quite a 
number of diaalloVJances from book value. Examples are: where 
existing plant is taken over by a corporation, the California 
Commission VTill allow only oPiginal cost of the plant, less 
depreciation; they remove from the r ate base any amount in 
excess of this figure whioh is paid in acquiring such plant, 
ev<!ln though reproduction cost nevr or r eproduction cost of 
service may exceed actual price paid. Where new plant is buil't;, 
within the Bell system, they will not use the cost of plant 
which the Bell company pays to Western Electric Company for 
such plant, but v1ill deduct Vlestern Ele ctrio Company' a p:r•ofit 
from the cost , 23 then they will add an amount equal to what 
the Bell Company is ea r n i ng on its rate base within their area., 
23 A table in the appendix shows the Wes tern Electri c 
Company ' s profits, arr anged by product class. It is included 
to enable tho reader to judge the relative signifi cance oi' the 
profit . 
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and use the resultant figures in the rnto base. They disallow 
a portion of the service oontl'act foe which Pacific Telephone 
pays American Telephone and Tolegraph for engineering , finan-
cial, and legal services. 
Tho retu1•n which is al lowed is greate r• on common equity 
in situations where t he true risk capital invested is in a 
holdi ng company investment, gaining the advantage of two or 
more layer s of leverage . The small independent is una ble to 
obta in debt financing at such reasonable figures as are avail-
able to tho la rger companies, hence tho equity holder gains 
l ittle, if any, leverage advantage. 
Interest rate trends in recent years have made it 
increasingly difficult even f'or the Bell companies to gain a 
great deal through leverage advantage. In recent years, five 
Bell company bond issues have borne face ra te s in excess of 
five per cent. As of the close of 1959 , ten General Telephone 
and Electronics companies ha d bond issues at five per cent or 
greater face rates. 
CIIAP1.'.U: H V 
TOLL HA'rES ANJJ DIZPAHI'l'IES 
One phase of the telephone regula tory problem which has 
been receiving a greater degree of attention in r•ecent years 
centers around toll rates and disparities. Toll rates refera 
to the charges for various classes of long-distance calls. 
Disparities refers to apparent discrepancies in the se charges, 
where such dis crepancies exist . Disparities of any marked 
degree seldom exist within a state. They appear when one con-
siders intrastate toll charg$s as compared wi t h interstate 
charges for simila1~ ser•vice. 'fhe problem centers around rates 
of return allowed by the l<'ede11 al Comruunicatl ons Commlssion, 
vthen dealing with inter•state r•atea, as comparecl ·with the rate 
allowed by the state commissions when dealing vii th intra a tate 
rates. l(nowledge of the separations procedure is of equal 
impor•tance in understanding hovt such disparities can come to 
be . The separations procedure refers to the accounting process 
whereby a determination is made of what port:i.on of plant is 
being used for interatnto service. This is not a si1ople matter 
of making n decision about each item of e quipment. Certa in 
plant equipment items may be used only in interstate service, 
others might be used part of the time to provide interstate 
service, part of the tima for intrastate service, and part of 
the time in local messAge service. 
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I. BAC.KGHOlJND 0.£<1 '.J!liE DISPAHI'l'IES PHOBLEM 
On November 14, 1946, the Notional Association of 
Hni ll·oad and Utility Commissioners, meeting fol" tho i r annual 
convention in Los Angeles, odopted a resolution which read in 
part as follows: 
RESOLVED, That the ~ederal Communications Commission 
is respectfully requested to p:r•oceed under the coopera-
tive plan befor e considering any further reduction in 
the interstate message toll tolephono rate schedule, and 
it is f urther requested that ample opportunity first be 
given to each of the States to present testimony on the 
disparity existing between interstate and instrastate 
rates, and that in all oa ses a hearing be held •••• 1 
As a result of' this N>solut:ton, this problem was turned 
over to the Commissioners Association ' s "Joint Committee on 
'£ale phone Hegula tory Problema." In the intervening 14 years, 
through 1960, the National Association of 1iailroad and Utility 
Comwissioners has been constantly at v1ork on this problem, 
though little has been accomplished beyond a rather penetrating 
study entitled , 11 Message ·roll 'l'elopbone Hates and Dispa.ri ties" 
--Hoport of the NAHUC --l•1CC •roll Hate Subcomml ttee. 
At the 1960 convention of the National Association of 
tfailroad and Utility Commissioners, a new resolution was passed, 
reading, 
Whereas , There continues to exist a nationwide problem 
with reference to the disparity between charges f or inter-
state mesnuge toll telephone service and intrastate mes sage 
toll telephone service; and 
lNational Association of Rai lroad and Utility Commission-
ers, ££• £il· 1 p . 30ti. 
l 
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Whereas, ~allowing negotiations between representatives 
of the li'edc:ral Connnunicntions Commission and the American 
'l'e lephone and '£o l ograph Company , revised ta1•ii'fa were 
filed J•cducinB tho interstate messagt:J toll t elephone 
:rates by the sum of ~~50,000,000, effective September 19, 
1959 und l<'ebruary 7, 1960 1 which reduction aggravated, 
in part, the growing disparity between the long distance 
rates for interstate and intrastate telephone service; 
and 
Whereas, The Na tional Associa t i on of Ra ilr oad and 
Utili ties Commissioners inst1~ucted the Speclal Committee 
Coopet>ating with the Fede:£•a 1 Communications Commisnion 
in Studies of Telephone rlegulatory Problems to consider 
fur ther refinements in extant separations procedures 
which , if effected, may be applied toward reduction of the 
substantial disparity between intrastate and interstate 
toll ra tea. 
Novr, 'l1horefore, Be It Hesolved , This Association 
recommends that anyrodu¢tion ln intrastate revenue require-
ments resulting from such modifications or changes in 
Separations procedures bo u tilized by the respective state 
regulatory jurisdictions to reduce intra s tate toll rates 
which will tend to minimize the disparity between intra-
state and 1nteratate message toll rates in those state 
jurisdictions Ylherein such disparity exists; and, 
Be It Further .ttesolved , That a copy of this resolution 
be sentto the Chairman and each member of the Federal 
Communications Commission, the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, and
2
to the United States Independent 
Telephone Association . 
The preceding makes clear that despite progress to·ward 
coopera tion betwec.m the l•'edo1~a1 Communications Commission and 
the various state regulatory bodies , the disparity between 
interstate and intrastate rates continuos to widen. It has been 
2National Association of Railroad and Utility Commis-
sioners , Heport of the Special Committee Cooperating .Y!.!1h the 
.b'odora l Comwunioations Commission in Studies of 'l'elephone 
Hegula ·iiory Pr•o blems (Washington: National Assoc'fii'tion of 
llailroad and Utilities Commissioners , 1960), p . 13. 
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said that the ft,edei•al Conununioat i ons Commission has l e as 
concern 1'or t he economic health of the companies than have 
the state bodies. 'l'he state bodies are concerned with the 
ea rnings position of the companies at l east to the degree of 
insur ing future service and progress, f or such service and 
pr ogress is important for the well being of their ar eas. 
On Febr uary 17, 1950 the Truman Administration issued 
Executive Order 10110, establishing a " President ' s Communica-
tions Policy Boa1•d 11 to determine practices to be followed by 
the Federal Government in the communications field. 
One year later, this board tur ned in a 238 page r eport 
to the chief exeouti ve, including the fo1lovling commentary on 
toll rate dispartties, 
Since 1919 interstate long-distance rates have been 
periodically reduced, under the jurisdiction of both the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and the FCC. Over the 
period , 14 reductions have been made. Most r ecent action 
was taken on January 19 , 1951, when the FCC directed that 
A. T. & T. and ita 20 affiliates in the United States 
file a statement before March 23 on the basis of which 
decisions would be tal,en on a poss ible interim reduction 
of long-distance rates. Hearings to determine whether 
existing rates are unjust, unreasonable and burdensome 
were scheduled to begin April 16. 
The Commission ' s order was taken as occasion by the 
National Assooiation of Hailroad and Utilities Commis-
sioners (N AHUC )--representative of the state commissions 
whose responsibility is for intrastete r ates as distin-
guished f rom the interstate toll rates which F'CC is 
concerned--to petition to intervene and seek enlar gement 
of the issues. The NAHUC move was strongly endorsed by 
Senator Ernest w. MoF'arland of Arizona, Chairman of the 
Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee. In a letter to the Commis-
sioners, January 30, 1951, Senator Mc li'a t"land said in pa1•t: 
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'The problem of disparity in telephone rates has 
disturbed me fo:r a long time although l appreciate that 
1 t is commendable on the part of. the Federal regula tory 
agency to be vi8ilant in attempting to avoid an inordi-
nately high return to the American company on its plant 
investment. The trouble is that the general public does 
not realize that every move that is made to reduce long 
distance toll rates results directly or indirectly in an 
eventual increase in local exchange rates and in intra-
state toll telephone rates. 
Some of the examples ••• of differences between an 
interstate toll rate and an intrastate rate for an 
identical or noarly identical mileage a~e almost fan-
tastic. For instance, the three minute station-to-station 
rate between Florence and Yuma, Arizona is $1.05 while 
the rate for the same service between Yuma and Winterhaven, 
California, is 80¢ although the telephone r oute mileage 
is identical, namely 197 miles •••• 
We all knoVI that tho nationvtide telephone plant is a 
complex and closely integrated structure and that over the 
years no sepaL)ation formula has been wholly fair or wholly 
satisfactory either to the American company and the 
associated companies or to the 48 state commissions. But 
one thing is clear to all of us--there v1ould be no long 
distance telephone business without the local plant and 
the local telephone instr•ument in eo.ch home and business. 
• • • 
'l'he fact remains that while the Commission (I•,CC) has 
ordered long distance rates lowered, local exchange and 
intrastate rates have steadily increased. Moreover, while 
v1ages and other general expenses of doing business have 
increased tremendously, those who use the long distance 
actually get cheaper service. In my judgment, this 
anomaly cannot be explained away by merely insisting that 
greater volume of long distance business has brought this 
about since it is clear without any question that the basic 
volume increase is largely due to the tremendous expansion 
of local facilities .• 3 
The report to the President then brought up an entirely 
new aspect to be considered in telephone industry regulation, 
3Pr•esident' s Communications Policy Board, Telecommuni-
cations, ~ Program £2£ Progress (Washingtonz Government Printing 
Office, 195l), PP• 59-60. 
'I'he \'/aste1•n Union Telegraph Company also filed a 
petition to intervene, on the ground that a substantial 
reduction of long-distance rates might adversely affect 
ita financial stability. The General Services Adminis-
tration of the Federal Government also petitioned to 
intervene, citing that the Government is nmong the 
largest single customers of the Bell System.4 
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Thus v1e see that the Legislative and Executive branches 
of the Federal Government have given more than cursory ett en-
tion to this problem. The s ame r•eport to the President also 
states , 
imtes for the telegraphic services--telegram, tele-
typewriter exchange service (TWX) , and private leased 
lines--are given regulatory approval without adequate 
knowledge of the oosts of providing such services. Also, 
in passing upon long-distance telephone rates, the 
I~ederal Communications Commission should inform itself 
of the probable effect of proposed changes upon the 
position of the telegrap~ industry, and upon rates for 
local telephone service . 
Thus we see the President's committee suggesting as an 
added reason against beloVI-cost rates though not, it is assumed, 
as an independent consideration, that the economic position 
of the Western Union Telegraph Company be considered when 
establishing rates for the telephone industry, rather than 
baaing rates on plant investment, cost of capital, cost of 
providing service, and the other factor s generally used 1n ra t e 
case determination. 
4ill.9,., P• 61. 
5Ib1d., P• 15. -
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II. SIGNH'ICANCE 
It is apparent that none of the parties concerned-· 
the public, tho companies, the utilities commisaionaJ and the 
legislature--are pleased with the direction regulation has 
led the telephone industry :tnaofar no toll rate disparities 
are concerned. 
The regulatory bodies, both state and federal, and the 
operating companies, have no particular guilt in the matter. 
Just as the telephone industry grew over the years, so did 
tho regulatory agencies, so did the legal framework. Everyone 
concerned is doing that stratified part of the total job which 
is his to do , and doing it in a comparatively reasonable 
manner. The degree of integration of the industry suggests 
that no order may reasonably or properly come out of regulation 
unless there is a common agreement among regulatory agencies as 
to their function and their methods. They are not responsible 
for the legal framework which surrounds them. It comes with the 
j ob. 
The National Association of Railroad and Utilities Com-
missioners has seen the need for order and coordination in their 
policies, certainly since long before 1946, the date mentioned 
as the start of coordination between the state commissions and 
the Federal Communications Commission, on the toll disp~rit:tee 
matter. Nevertheless, they are limited by legal framework . 
Progress is al.OTI, but that the majority of' the state agencies, 
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and tho I<'oder al Government, are Vlell aware of the problems and 
the need is made clear by the documentation offered. 
The appendix contains a table showing the rates for 
interstate long distance calls, as compared to the intra• 
state rates for calls of similar distance, for each state. 
In no case does the intrastate call oost less than the inter-
state call. 
III. LOCAL SEHVICE RA'l'ES 
'l'elephono companies at'e not regulated on an industry-
wide nor a state-wide basis. They are regulated on a company-
wide basis. This is done within each state, and for each 
company within the state. The cost of local service is not 
directly comparable between one state and another, or between 
one company and another, because the largest single fa ctor 
considered in rate regulation is the return on total plant 
investment. States which have a great deal of intrastate or 
originating end interstate toll service are likely to have 
lower local service rates than those which have little toll 
service. 'rhe cost of local service is also dependent upon 
plant investment quality. Where operating companies have been 
unable to plan their plant on a long term basis, the plant 
investment per telephone becomes much higher. These points 





As the exchange becomes larger, the charge for service 
becomes greater. This is because of commission consideration 
of value of service. The concept involved is t hat the 
service becomes more valuable as the subscriber is able to 
call greater numbers of othor subscribers without toll 
charges . 
Local service rates var•y over a vii de range . An indi vi-
dual f~t rate residence telephone in a 10,000 line Bell 
exchange in Louisiana costs ~3.50. Simila r se rvice in Idaho 
costs ~\ 6 . 65. A chart is included in the appendix, showing the 
extent of local service rate variation. 
The appendix a l so contains a list of tests which com-
missions have used in past times to determine the reas onableness 
of ra tea. 
CHAPTEH VI 
EMPLOYMEN'£ AND INFLATION 
The effects of the inflation which our economy has 
known since World War II haa boen particulo.rly ho.rd on all 
utilities. Heproduction cost of plant often runs 200 to 300 
1 per cent of original cost. In the past 20 years, the con-
sumers ' dollar has l ost about 50 per cent of its purchasing 
power value.2 The rate of earnings in the telephone industry 
is seldom alloVIed t o exceed 7.5 per cent of depreoia ted boolt 
value, and in many areas is under 6 per cent . Despite these 
conditions the telephone industry has managed to continue to 
attr•aot capital, and to provide an improving quality of 
service, at a purchasing power cost to the consumer which has 
declined, rather than risen, over the years. 
I. AU'l'OMATION AND EFFICil!:NCY 
The accomplishment mer .. tioned above shows that the 
telephone companies have managed to increase their earnings 
over the years to offset the effects of inflation . Donald 
c. Pov1er, Chairman of the Board of Genet•al Telephone and 
1Publ1c Utilities Fortnightly, 22• ~~., September 29, 
1960, P• 348. 




Electronics spoke of utility earnings thus: 
There are just three ways you can increase prof its in 
a ut1lity·-you can raise your rates--reduce your expenses 
--or sell more stuff-- that is merchandise your product.3 
All three of these methods have been used by the 
telephone companieso Of the three, the most important has 
been reducing expenses. The process used in reducing expenses 
has been through increasing efficiency by turning to automa~ 
tion. Automation is the result of research. Insofar as the 
Bell system is concerned, tb.e operating companies have pur•-
chased this research, indirectly, through their service 
contract with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
by means of Vlhioh they contribute to the costs of operating 
Bell Telephone Laboratories . 
Donald Power has commented on the value of research, as 
follows: 
We know fr•om actual experience that research pays off 
at the rote of from 100~ to 200% a year, and over a 25-year 
period , that means $100 spent on research will bring back 
anywhere from $2500 to ~p5000--depending of course upon the 
indus t ry and the company. Here is another clincher: From 
50% to 75% of the products of many large companies today 
are either radically or completely different from their 
products of fifteen ~ears ago. Hesearch, and only research, 
brought that change. 
3sheehan, ££· £!i., P• 117. 
4oonald c. Power, Address at 'l'ovm Hall, Los Angeles, 
nesearch has led the telephone industry further and 
further into automation. This trend to automation has been 
neces sary for technical reasons, relating to the speed, 
accuracy, and convenience it provides; and t aking into con-
sideration the ever increasing volume of telephone business 
in conjunction with rising labor costs, it is necessary to 
cut the time which personnel spend rela tive to each call to 
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an absolute minimum. Automation has also led to increased 
investment, increase d efficiency, and an actual decline in the 
number of pe ople employed in the telephone industry. 
It is a common view among economists and others that 
net new investment provides new jobs. This is not necessarily 
true. A few charts showing trends of investment and employment 
in the telephone industry are placed at the end of this chapter 
to help illustrate the situation. 
In the telephone industr•y, the net plant investment per 
employee :J.s rising. The number of employees is declining. 
This is true of the Bell system!!~ whole, not just the 
operating telephone companies. There has been an increase in 
the number of employees in the Western Elect1~io Company, and 
Bell 'l1elephone Laboratories, over the years. 'l1his increase is 





'!'he table on page 66 shows trends in the Bell system.5 
The plant investment more than doubled in the decade 1950-60. 
The number of employees rose only 18 per cent for the system, 
12 per cent for the operating companies. In the five year 
period, 1955 through 1960, ther•e was a decline in the total 
number of' employees, both i n the system and in the telephone 
subsidiaries. The investment increased by 56 per cent in that 
five years. There vras a new neVI investment of 8.6 billion 
dollars, with no new jobs created, but a decrease in employment 
by 10,000 jobs. 
A particularly interesting aspect of this development 
is that the 'system' figures come very close to representing 
every level of production. Western Electric Company' s subsidi• 
ary, Nas sau Sn1elting and Hefining Company, produces copper. 
The Bell 'l1elephone Laboratories develop automatic switching 
systems. The Western Electric Company manufactures and installs 
the systems. The telephone subsidiaries operate them. It is 
probable that the net new investment, ~~8 .64 billion, did not 
create an;y new jobs. 
•rbis is not a critic ism of the actions of the companies. 
Under the regulatory setup they are forced to keep the cost of 
service low. To follow any course othe:r• than into automation 
I 
would have left 'them open to serious criticism from regulatory 
5compiled from Annual Reports 2! ~ American T~lephone 










NET PLANT VALUE 
(Million $) 
No. of Employees 
1950 1955 1959 1960 
523,251 615,895 582,860 580,405 
'73,458 120 , 054 134,867 143,352 
5,757 9,680 11,308 12,009 
602,466 745,629 729,035 '735,766 
$ 10,102 ~ 15,430 $ 22,205 ~ 24,072 
l 
agencies and from the public. The trend is unfortunate for 
the sake of the American economy, however, it is the econom-
ically feasible and the proper course. 
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Some statistics relativo to the substitution of capital 
for labor in the telephone industry follow. They are sketchy 
because the information os to investment and employment 
trends Inust be taken from annual reports. 
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TABLE VII 
EMPLOYMEN~? RE LATIVE 1'0 PLAN1' INVBSTMENT 
GENE HAL ~'l.!:LEPHONE COMPANY OF IOWA 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Total 
Employees 245 296 285 266 270 
Investment (Thousand $ ) 3784 4902 6048 6839 7161 
Investment per Employee 
(Thousand $ ) 15.4 18.2 21.2 25.6 26.2 
GENEHAL 'rELEPHONF: COMPANY OF NEBRASKA 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Total 
Employees 178 157 140 176 178 
Investment (Thousand $ ) 3050 3267 3940 5100 6008 
Investment per Employee 
('l1housand *' ) 17.3 20.8 28.1 29.0 33 . 8 
GENEHAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF tUSSOUHI 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Total 
Employees 353 354 326 300 291 
Investment (Thousand $ ) 4358 5088 6571 8173 9185 
Investment per Employee 
(Thousand ~~ ) 12.3 14.3 20.2 27.2 31.6 
Source: Informational reports issued by the companies 
mention during the year 1959. Figures substantiated by annual 
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Source: "Financial Sta tistica, 1959" published by 
General Telephone and Electronics Corporation. 
FIGURE 2 
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE 
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*65 '56 '57 ' 58 ' 59 
Investment per employee, 1955 ... 16 thousand dollars, 353 emp . Investment per employee, 1959 - 38 thousand dollars , 291 emp. 
From "l955, 1959 - Five Years of Progress , " General Te l ephone Company of Missouri, 1959. 
F'IGUHE 3 
EMPLOYMENT AND INVES'l'MENT - 1959 
GENEHAL TELEPHONE OP MISSOURI 
l 
CHAPTER VII 
I•'AC'rOHS AFFECTING Tllli POSn~ION OF 'l1Illi :B'I ttM 
(APART FROM AC'riONS Ol'' HEGULATOHY BODIES) 
'l'here arc factors which influence the profit, cost of 
capital, and rate of growth of the telephone companies quite 
apart from the activities of telephone company management and 
the a ctions of regulatory agencies. Since the regulatory 
agencies have t he last wor•d this is not to say that they 
cannot override these factors . The nature of the more impor-
tant of these fa ctors, and their influence, are examined in 
this chapter. 
I. 'l'HE EXCISE 'l'AX 
{IT LACKS l•'ISCAL NEU'r HALI'l~Y) 
There is a ten per cent Federal excise tax on telephone 
ser•vice, and on most other communications services provided by 
the operating telephone companies . This tax is not on the 
company. It is on the service. The intent is that the tax be 
passed on to the consumer of' the service. Both the incidence 
and the impact of the tax are his to bear. The telephone 
companies collect this tax, and ostensibly bear the cost of 
collecting and accounting for it. Telephone bills , hovtever , 
list the tax as a separate item from the cost of service. 
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This tax was passed as a wartime measure during World 
War II, and though it has been roduced over the years, it 
still remains an important part of the coat oi' communications. 
Taxes aro levied for various purposes. They may be to 
provide revenue, they may be to regulate use. 'l'he excise tax 
on telephone service is intended as a tax to produce revenue. 
Suoh a tax should be fiscally neutr~l. To be fiscally neutral, 
a tax should not cause a shif't in expenditure 1'rom the thing 
taxed to a non taxed competitive item. 
Although there are no competitors in the direct sense 
as far as telephone service is concerned, the telephone com-
panies compete for the consumers ' dollar with the business 
community at large. An increase in the coat of service by ten 
per cent will cause a decrease in the quantity of service sold, 
as F'igure 4 on page 73 indicates. 
As the telephone companies are regulated utilities, the 
commissions will, in the long run, allow them rate increases so 
that their net income will cover their coat of capital. Thus 
the telephone user pays not only the tax, but must pay an 
i ncreased px•ice for telephone service because of the decrease 1 n 
the aggregate quantity of service taken by the public. The cost 
of collecting and accounting for the tax, supposedly borne by 




Quantity of uerv1oe wh1ob 
( will be used by telephone subooribera at var1oue prioes. 
0 
Let OP represent the cost of service to the subscriber 
prior to placing the excise tax in effect. 
Let P P ' represent the tax. 
0 P ' represents the subscribers cost after the tax is 
pla ced in effect. 
The quantity of service taken will be reduced from Q 
to Q1 as a result of the tax causing a reduction in use of 
service. 
FIGU.HE 4 
EFFECT OF EXCISE 'rAX ON SE,HVICE 
l 
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'rhia is a discriminatory tax which causes a restl•ic-
tion of output of service, through reducing the total amount 
of service demanded. It is borne by the consumer of the 
service in some quantity in excess of its apparent ten per 
cent rate. 
In the short run, the telephone companies lose when 
such discriminatory taxes as this are placed in effect, for 
rate making bodies will not adjust rates upward until some 
time after such increased coats and decreases in demand occur. 
(Regulatory lag. ) In the long r un, the cost must be borne in 
total by users of telephone ~ervice, or else the capitalized 
value of the equity holders investment must drop, due to the 
decrease in earnings. 
II. GOVEHNMBNT MONBTAHY AND FISCAL POL ICY 
Government monetary policy and fiscal policy {the taxing 
and spending programs of government) have a profound j,nfluence 
on the position of utility investors. 
The American economy is constantly faced Vlith a dual 
faceted pr•oblem of maintaining full employment without infla-
tion. Political expediency oftimes dictates the implementation 
of programs which may seem proper when observed in a stratified 
sense J by themselves alone. 'l'hese programs oft imee lack 
reasonableness when viewed in their relationship to the economy 




As an example, government sanctions labor unions. It 
offers them support through legislative means. Modern day 
unions manage to secure wage increases which exceed the 
increase in productivity for the periods involved. The 
economy is, as a result, faoed with three apparent choices . 
They are underemployment, underinvestmant, or inflation. 
The underemployment will result from a decrease in the 
aggregate supply of goods and services offered , as firms cut 
back output t o as to operate at the point where their marginal 
cost of production is equal to their marginal vevenue. 
The marginal cost--marginal revenue chart on page 76 
indicates the condition. As the quantity of goods and services 
to be produced after a wage increase in excess of increased 
product! vi ty is granted is less than befor·e the increase, the 
number of manhours needed to produce the goods is likewise 
decreased. The result is a decrease in employment as a result 
of the increase in wages. 
The second alternative 1s to take the wage increase out 
of the earnings of capital. If this is done, the ear•nings 
per share of stock is decreased. The capitalized value of the 
earnings falls. The result is a destruction of the equity 
holders investment value. The effect on the economy is to 
inb:t.bit net new investment. Our economy must have net new 
investment t o gain the advantages which technological advance-




Marginal cost after wage inorease 
Marginal oost befor·o Ttage increase 
~------~~---~Marginal revenue 
Qf Q 
~ and P .. Quantity and pr1oe befoz•e wage inot~ease. 
q,' and P 1 - Quantity and pr1oe after wage inct~ea se. 
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labor force, in other areas increasing productivity through 
the deepening of' capital. 
The third alternative is to allow inflation to such 
a degree as to offset the effect of the wage increase. This 
plays a ha r dshi p on those poople who possess f ixed incomes: 
pensioners, bondholders, and the like. 
The actions of government, i n r ecent years, whether in 
a Democ1•atic or .Hepublican ad ministration, has been to temper 
monetary and fiscal policy so as to allow inflation. The need 
for full employment is viewed as being a more important factor 
than the usually delayed but devastating eff'ects of inflation. 
In the last 30 years, 1929 through 1959, the gross 
national product deflator has risen from 57.4 to 108.2, with 
1954 at 100 . The wholesale price index has increased 92 per 
1 
cent. The consumers price index has increased 69 per cent. 
The chart on page 78 shov1a the loss in value of the 
U. s. dollar , based on the consumers price index of the Un:J.ted 
States Department of Labor: 
To relate these influences on the total economy to the 
telephone industry, we need but to look at the earnings r ecord. 
Earnings are tied to net plant value. If inflation is equal 
to earnings, there is no profit in risk taking. If inflation 
1Public Utili ties Fot•tnightly, .2.2 . ill•, September 29, 
1960, p. 434. 
l 
TABLE VIII 
INFLATION , 1941-1956 
Period 
1941 to Jan 1957 (16 years) 
Wartime 1941•45 (4 years) 
Postwar 1945-48 (3 years) 
Stable period 1948-50 
Korean war 1953-56 
Eisenhower 1953-56 













Hate of Loss 
*It should be remembered that these are aggre ga te 
figures. Though the aggregate is unchanged, there was a con-
siderable fall in the price of agricultural commodities, 
offsetting a rise in othor areas. 
is equal to depx•eciation allowance, then deprecla tion funds 
cannot replace plant as its useful life expires. 
Earl A. Spiller , Jr., a prominent writer on Publi c 
Utility Accounting, has said: 
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From 1940 to 1952 the purchasing power of the reported 
earnings of industr•ial common stocks increased 38~~ on the 
average and the purchasing poVIer of the ma1•ket p1•ice had 
increased 18%. In the same period the purchasing power 
of the common stock earnings of utilities on the average 
declined 28% and the purchasing power of the market price 
decreased 31%.~ 
Utilities are more affected by inflation than any 
other class of business. 1'h.ey are faced with tho constant 
necessity to increase their oarninga to offset the rising 
coat of the things they buy. Regulatory bodies are slow to 
roaot. Attr•ition and regulatory lag have a serious detri-
mental effect on their position. The rapid rote of expansion 
in the industry, and the marked degree to which they have 
l turned to automation have done muah to offset the effects of 
inflation, but the problem remains. 
III. It'EDEitAL H.ESERVE POLICY 
'rhe li'ederal neserve Board of Governors determines what 
shall be the rediscount rate and the reserve requirement f'or 
banks which are members of the Peder•al Heserve System. r.rhese 
2 Earl A. Spiller, Jr., "Corrunon Dollar Accounting and the 
Hate Base ," Public Utilities Fortnightly, Soptomber 29, 1960, 
P• 440. 
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policies, in conjunction VJith their open market operations, 
and in conjunction with the operations of the Treasury Depart-
ment, go a great way toward determining the J:10ing rate of 
interest within our economy. (The actions of the Federal 
lie serve and the monetary, but not fiscal , acts of the Treasui•y 
Department are properly te1~ed as monetary policy of the 
Federal Gove1•nment.) 
The going rate of interest has a profound effect on 
f inancing in the Telephone Industry. When the interest rate 
is equal to the earnings per share oi' common stock, expressed 
aa a percentage of market price, a utility has only the factor 
of the prospect of enhanced future earnings as an incentive 
to induce the investor to undertake the risk inherent in equity 
holding. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company has been 
forced by circun1stance in recent years to issue bonds bearing 
a face rate in excess of f ive per cent, while at the same time, 
the earnings of many of their subsidiary companies was just 
over six per cent on the depreciated original £2!i of plant in 
service. 
One effect of this sort of financing is that the sub-
scribers to telephone service in those areas which yield the 
highest returns must pay a part of the cost of capital used in 
provid ing service in the areas where the return is the lowest. 
The hardship is greater on the small ope1,a ting company. 
An examination of the annual report of the California Interstate 
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•relephone Company, 1'or the year ending Mar'ch 31, 1960, reveals 
an income of ~b922,345 before fixed charges . The depr·eciated 
original cost of plant and equipment at the time was 
,p23,330,337. The return , bofore fixed charges, v1as under 4 
par cent. An examination or the capital structure of the 
company reveals the company has five issues of bonds outstand-
ing. The face rate on these bonds runs from 4t to 5{ per cent. 
The goin£! rate of interest was so high at the time the 
bonds were issued tha t it was necessary to pay a cost of 
capital on bond money in exc~sa of the rate of earnings of the 
company . 
IV . SUMMAHY 
The degree of instability in tho American economic 
system at the present time, particularly with reference to 
interest rates and inflation, works a hardship on all utility 
companies. Hate making bodies often are unable to make such 





ATTHPl'ION , LAG, AND IJ.'HE LONG PULL 
The three terms--attrition, lag, and the long pull--
have come to be accepted abbreviated expressions for three 
problems in the telephone industry, indeed in all utilities, 
which have become of paramount importance in the inflation 
years since the end of World War II. 
I. A'.CT HIIJ.'ION 
Almost without exception, regulatory bodies sanction 
rates on the basis of pas t performance over a given period, 
most frequently the previous year. In times of constantly 
rising costs, any established rate of return tonds to become 
inadequate in the subsequent period as higher costs eat away 
at profit margins. Attrition is the reduction of the rate of 
return o~used by additions to plant at a higher cost per unit 
than the cost per unit at the time the rates , which remain 
unchanged, were established. To quote an industry source in 
1 order to clarify this meaning, 
If the a verage earnings per telephone remains constant, 
the following illustrates what happens when the Plant 
Investment per Telephone increases in $10.00 steps: 
1"The Earnings Story - 1960,u The Chesapeake and Pttomao 
Telephone Company of West Virginia. Mimeographed, p.3. 
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TABL.E IX 
EFFEOTG Oli' A'l"rur.riOH ON PLAN'!' INVES'l'MENT 
Net Income Plant Investment % 
Per Telephone Por Telephone He turn 
$ 12.60 ~t> 180 7.00 
l 12.60 190 6.63 
12 . 60 200 6 . 30 
12.60 210 6.00 
12.60 220 6 . 73 
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These figures represent a hypothetical situation, and 
rofer to the x•eturn Vlhich v1ill be e~rned by new plant invest .. 
ment, or by roinvested dep1•eciation funds in an inflationary 
period following a r ote base establishment. In order to 
clarify the effoct upon investment , let us again turn to the 
Industry source,2 and see what happens to the average return 
on investment as plant is enlarged. (See Table X.) 
The result of this sort of thing oan be very detri-
mental to the operating oorupany's position. It is not the 
intent of . rat·e making bodies that such a thing happen . They 
are powerless, however, to control inflation. 
II. HEGULATOHY LAG 
Rate adjustments are granted on the basis of past 
history. The delay between the dates covered by the fi gures 
and the effective date of t he commission ' s decision is seldom 
less than six months, seldom more than two years. 'l'his time 
interval is referred to as regulator y lag. The effect is one 
of causing companies to sustain los ses during the intorval 
botvteen showing they need a greater return, and the commissions 
granting that roturn. 
Attrition and r egulatory lag ore not one way streets. 
Should vte have a deflationary period in this country's economy, 
the attrition and regulatory lag would work to the benefit of 
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the componies. The past twenty years have seen no such 
period. The effects of attrition, regulatory lag, and the 
rising costs of operation due to inflation have been particu-
larly hard on telephone companies~ 
If we consider the maxim that any investment is worth 
the present value of its anticipated future earnings, and 
with this in mind, look at the record, the problem becomes 
cleor. 
Between 1946 and 1957 the market price and dividends 
of the common stocks of a representative group of utility 
companies increased 50 per cent. In competitive indus try the 
market price and dividends noarly tripled. The market price 
-~ of A. 'l'. & T. stock actually declined betVIeen 1946 and 1957, 
and its dividend remained unchanged. The company has an 
unbroken dividend record of over 80 years. In 9 of the years 
since 1931, the dividend was not earned, but paid from surplus, 
A. T. & T. earnings on total capital invosted have showed a 
steady decline since 1927. The high in 1927 and 1928 was 8.7 
per cent. There was a decline to 4 .3 per cent in 1933, then 
fluctuation between a high of 7 per cent in 1940 and a low of 
4.5 per cent in 1947. The average return for the 1925-1950 
period waa 6.26 per cent. 3 




In 1959 the A. T. & T. 1 s earnings (net i ncome before 
fixed charges) on investment (stock interest, A. T. & T.; 
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plus stock held by the public in consolidated subsidiaries; 
plus funded debt) was 7.29 per cent. In 1960 this figure rose 
to 7.35 per cent.4 
The 7.35% return on gross investment appears quito 
attractive, but such investment must be judged on the basis of 
the price-earnings ratio of the stock. On December 30th, 1960, 
the market price of A. ·r. & ~r. was ~~107 per share. 'l'he earnings 
for 1960 were ~~5.53 per share. This is a price earnings l"atio 
of 5.17 per cent. Of the $5,53 earned on each share, ~3.30 was 
paid to the equity holdel"' as dividend. 
These figures give rise to the question, "Why does 
A. T. & T. Company stock remain attractive to the investor in 
view of this earnings record?" The ansvrer appears to be bound 
up in its stable dividend policy, its stable market price, 
and its value as an inflation hedge. It has come to be known 
as "'J.'he widows and orphans stock" and the "Stock that acts like 
a bond." 'l'he last half of 1960 and early 1961 have seen 
conaider•a ble fluctuation in market price of A. T. & 'I'., prin-
cipally because of its stock split, increase in dividends, 
issuance of rights, and suggestion of an additional increase 
in dividends. 
4comp1led from Annual He-ports of t l1e Amerioan T~elephone 




The A. T. & T. Company was chosen for the preceding 
illustrations because any single operating company would not 
give a true picture of nation-VIide condi tiona. 'rhe General 
'.relephone and Electronics Corporation gets 64 per cent of 1 ts 
income from non-regulated sources as compared to the A. T. & 
T.'s 25 per cent. 5 For this reason, General Telephone would 
not malce a suitable example. A chart showing the trend of 
utility stock prices ovor the past 18 years is included in 
the appendix. 
• 
III. THE LONG PULL 
Since it is apparent that the American Telephone and 
'l'elegraph Company has managed to hold and attract investment, 
it is fair to question the effects of inflation, attrition, and 
regulatory lag. It is in this connection that 1 The Long Pull ' 
enters the picture. The long pull refers to the expansion 
program of operating companies. Low earnings force their 
expansion to be confined to short term needs. This sort ot 
expansion causes a dilplication of expense, and results in 
highe~ cost for plant of equivalent service capabilities. This 
higher cost will ultimately be placed in the rote base by the 
state commissions , and the final result will be a higher coat 
for phone service as a result of inadequate earnings and short 
term expansion today. This, at first consideration, sounds like 
5oetermined from examination of annual reports of' companies 
mentionod. 
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publicity paid for with indus try money in order to obtain 
greater earnlngs. Such ts not the case. 'l'he rate making 
bodies , in large measure, arc in sympathy with the companies 
in this problem. To quote from a National Association of 
Hailroad and Utility Commisuioner's statement in 1958 , 
I t now appears that this nation is on the road to 
recovery from the re cent recession and embarl<:ing on a 
course of new economic expansion. Economists predict 
that it v1ill be a more competitive economy, vlt th compe-
tition not only for markets but also for capital to achieve 
better quality of products and lower costa. Inflationary 
measures vtill not be contained. In this atmosphere utility 
management cannot afford to proceed on the premise that 
their spheres of operation are non-competitive. To the 
extent that they achieve the potential in holding dovm 
costs and i ·mpro vement of service, in t hat measure will 
they prosper and the users of service benefit. 
This will require substantial sums for research and 
plant expansion. F'or management and investors it poses 
the question of participation in ultimate benefits. 
Weighing the equities of the use1•s of service and the 
providers of service, regulation can best serve the 
i nterests of both with an answer that will provide the 
required incentive. 
In this report your ooraruittee has pointed out the 
volume of expenditures of public utili ties for expansion 
and replacement of facilities, and the upward trends of 
construction costs. Attention has bean called to the long 
periods required for capital turnover. 
The report of your committee submitted lest year pointed 
out the ultimate advantages to be achieved by designing 
and constructing utility plant and planning operating pro-
cedures on a long range basis to obtain for the rate-payer 
and the investor the most efficient utili zation of the 
invested dollar. 1'o do this a company must have the 
financial strength to take the risk of added capital com-
mitment and to temporarily forego current income. When 
lack of earnings dictates the short term program, the 
resulting patchwork or "make do 11 is cheaper for this or• 
next year. But ultimately the results of such a policy 
are higher expense, higher rates, and more capital. 
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The results of a study published in the June 16, 1958 
issue of Electrical Viorld show that residential electric 
rates are lower for those c ompanies ha ving the highest 
rates of return than for t hose companies having the 
lowest rates of r eturn, The articles state: ' While 
only good management can initiate better earnings, the 
cont inuance of good management is in turn dependent upon 
sustained good earnings. This type of management will 
be able to opera t e more economically, less on a piece-
meal basis, and with long-range economies in mind. In 
other words , good earnings mus t result in economies which 
management is able to pass along to consumers. 
A similar relationship between earnings and rates is 
found in the telephone industry . In general the Bell 
Companies with the better earnings ha ve lower than average 
rates for the system, a higher percentage of telephones 
converted to dial, a higher percentage of operator toll 
dialing, and a wider range of extended area service. 
A review of recently decided oases, some of which are 
cited herein, discloses an increasing tendency of regula-
tory conm1is sions to make allowances that wi 11 per·mi t and 
encourage expansion. This evidences the awareness of 
many regulatory bodies of the importance and ultimate 
advantages of giving cons ideration to these factors 1n the 
establishment of rates . 
Needless to say, in any rate making process that will 
give consideration to allowances for long-term planning, 
the initiat i ve lies vdth the applicant in submitting 
pro je cted plans for opera t ion and e xpans i on, the forecasts 
upon which they are predicated and a review of past 
experience as regards the relationship between expansion 
and earnings. Regulatory commissions cannot, in their 
disposition of rate applications, make provisions for 
adequate earnings without evidence in the record to justify 
such action. 
In the road that lies ahead, public utilities and regula-
tory commie siona should take a long look fo1 .. ward. Inevi t-
ably t he interests of the rate payer and t he provider of 
service find themselves , in a large measure, in the same 
boat. You can ' t sink half a boat . 'rhe Public Service Com· 
mission of Missouri, commenting on the allowance of certain 
expenses not specific to t he test year said, •Utility rates 
are not made for the teat; year, but for the following year• 




determine rates required in the future. 6 
This report was signed by commissioners from 11 states, 
Ohio, South Dakota, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Alabama, 
West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi , South Carolina, and 
Kansas . As it was a report of the "Committee on Hates" it 
probably reflects, in large measure, the thinking of the 
majority of commission members today. 
IV. EXPANSION AND 'l?HE P HOI1'IT MAHGIN 
P. M. Schuchart, of the Florida Railroad and Public 
Utilities Commission, r•elated the problems of the long pull to 
expansion in the telephone industry, saying: 
Since the end of World Wa r II •• • the telephone industry 
has almost four times the plant in service and has added 
37 million telephones ••• to accomplish this growth public 
utilities (not just telephone ) have raised about $35 billion 
of growth oapital~"nearly half of all the new money raised 
publicly by corporations ln the United States in this 
poriod • •• The utility industry has to compete with all 
other industries in the market place for capital . This is 
one area w9ere utility management has no monopolistic 
advantage. 
Schuchart then related rate increases and the cost of 
service to the rate-payer to the overall problem: 
6National Association of Railroad and Utility Commis-
sionersJ Report of the Committee on Rates of Public Utilities 
(Washington: Natfonal Association-or Railroad and Utility 
Commissioners, 1968) . 
7P. M. Schuchart , Commissioner of the Flot•ida Railroad 
and Public Utilities Commission, reported in Telephone Engineer 
and Manasement, October, 1958. (Reprint , 6 pages.) 
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Costs of service have risen during the post war 
inflation period, but far less than the prices of almost 
everything else t he consumer buys. • .This slower rate of 
increase in the cost of utility services over the years 
reflects vast and expensive research programs carried out 
by the utilities ••• it reflects also •• • a sincere 
determination on the part of those who manage utilities 
to make resulting service improvetnents available pr•omptly 
--in other words to provide an ever-improving service at 
as low a cost to ' the consumer as is possible.8 
This exposition of the management ' s position relating 
to coat of capital, and the rate-payer' a pos1 tion in 1•egard to 
cost of service is related to the long pull in the statement, 
"Any company forced to 11 ve at a ' Bare Bones' level cannot 
9 affor•d the risk of any large-scale change. 11 
That the effects of rising costs are not a small matter 
to the telephone industry can be seen in the folloVIing r•eport 
fr om It' or tune Magazine: 
The struggle to keep rates up to the mark is a continuous 
one. It has to be: The cost of installing a telephone in 
1951 was $150; toda1
0
the cost per installation is *600, up 
~30 from last year. 
(This $600 figure rept•esents the ratio of new plant invest-
ment to new telephones, not just "installation" costs as 
the quotation might be taken to imply. ) 
This increased cost came into the picture even prior to 
1951, the yeaz• mentioned by Fortune Magazine. A government 
source reported in 1951: 
alli_9.. 
9~. 
lOsheehan, 2£• £1&., P• 8. 
Since 1939 average hourly earnings in the telephone 
industry have increased 70% and costs of materials have 
inor•eased more than pr•oportionally. For ina tan co, ln 
1949, eleotpolytio copper vtas 2 .2 times its 1939 cost, 
zinc 3.3 times the 1939 coat, and lead 3.38 times the 
1939 cost. These rising costa have been offset in part 
by oper•ating economies and by local rate increases .11 
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Pr esident of General 1l 1elephone and Electronics Corpora-
tion Don G. Mitchell, in a paper presented to the United States 
Independent Telephone Association ' s 1960 convention phrased 
it, "Adequate ea't•nings will , in the long run, enable a company 
to provide better• service at a lower price than would otherwise 
be possible." 12 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Ther•e is a growing area of agreement between rate making 
bodies and the telephone industry as to the policies which will 
best serve the interest of both the user of telephone service, 
and the investor in utility securities. 
Extension and development of this field of agreement may, 
in the near future, lead to a higher cost of t elephone service 
in t ho short r un, but to a lov10r coat and higher quality service 
in the long run. 
11Telecommun1cat1ons, ~ frogram £2£ Progress , ~· ~. , 
P • 58. 
12•relephone Engineer .!ru! Management, October•, 1960. 




The objectives of the telephone industry and of the 
rate making groups run in close parallels to each other. As 
the National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners, 
quoted on page 91 expressed it, 11 You can't sink half of a 
boat . " Both the commissions and the industry management want 
a healthy industry. The viewpoints as to how to insure a 
healthy industry, concurrent with the lowest possible cost of 
sez•vice to the rate payer, vnry. A considerable part of the 
problem comes from regulation by states, wherein the~e is no 
close corr•elation between the processes in one state and tho 
processes in the next. Conversely, it would be as fair to say 
that the problems stem from the corporations being so large 
that the real profit taking on risk investment is done outside 
the area of regulation, through holding companies. 
I. THE NEED F'OR EXPANSION 
The growth period of the American economy which followed 
World War II made 1t necessary for the telephone companies to 
raise huge amounts of new capital at a time when the earnings 
on common stock were declining due to inflation. An example 
indicative of this decline can be sean in the market price of 
A. '11 • & T., which dropped from 200k in 1946 to 138 in 1949. 
1 
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\ft'hile this v1as happening, the Bell System found it 
necessary to rnisa new capital for expansion. The f all ing 
price or their common stock was an influence tending to turn 
them to bond money to meet these expansion needs. At the 
same time, many of the stat~ commissions, in their rate making 
decisions wer•e questioning the necessity of maintaining a low 
debt ratio. Utility 11 expert witnesses" Vlere brought in to 
prove that if more debt was sold, the resulting tax savings 
could be passed on to consumers, who would benefit through 
lower rates. (It should be remembered that interest on bond 
money is an expense, deductible from gross income before 
arriving at the net income upon which corporate income tax must 
be paid. Dividends , on either common or preferred stock, must 
come out of the net income after corpot•a te income tax.) 
Be tween 1945 and 1960, the Boll system has sold its 
investors nearly $ 13 billion of now securities , nea1•ly three 
times the systems entire capital at the close of World War II. 
Of this amount, about 41 per• cent was raised th1~ough the sale 
of mortgage bonds, debenture bonds, and convertible debentures. 
II • Sb:LEC'J.' ING THE DEB'l' HAT IO 
The holding company manages a rate of retut•n to the 
common equity holder which is far in excess of the return which 
the company recieves on total investment . This is accomplished 
through leverage , obta ining a portion of the invested capital 
l 
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at low interest rates through the issuance of bonds . 11he 
difference between the bond face rat e, adjus t ed to compensate 
for px•emium or discount at time of initial sale, and the rate 
of retu~1 on total i nvestment is passed on to the equity 
holder. In the case of ind~pendent companies , only one "layer " 
of leverage exists between tihe equity holder and tho plant 
investment. In consequence rate payers must pay a higher 
price for the investment in plant areas served by independent 
companies if t he equity holdor is to recei ve the same return 
on his investment . 
As a consequence of the cost of plant investment being 
lower• in areas where debt is greater within the oper•a ting 
companies , commissions and public utility authorities suggest 
that a high debt ratio is represents t1 ve of wise management 
where utility managers ohooso sources of capital. It should 
also be considered that as debt is increased, the risk to the 
equity holder is increased, and he will expect a greater 
return on his investment. 
The American Telephone and 'l'elegraph Company has been 
very resistant to any increase in debt ratio above a 40 per 
oent figure . They attempt , from all appearances, to maintain 
a ratio between 30 and 40 per cent. General Telephone and 
Electronics ratio , as of the close of 1959 , was 44 per cent 
common stock equity, ll per cent prefer red stoak , and 45 per 
cent debt. The effect of the preferred stock is to offer more 
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leverage to the equity holder, while not subjecting the 
coi•poration to the risk inherent in tho fixed interest charges 
that go with funded debt. Considerable conflict exists in 
the utility management field as to the prudence of increasing 
the debt ratio. As the debt ratio is increased, the risk to 
which the equity holders' investment is subject is increased. 
This is because the bonds, which are senior securities, have 
prior claim as to earnings, and as to assets in event of 
dissolution. 
In one view, the common stock of General Telephone is 
a very high risk variety of utility stock, because the debt 
securities of the holding company have prior claim to the 
holding company ' s assets and earnings. The holding company's 
assets consist almost wholly of the common equity issues of 
the subsidiary companies. The debt of the subsidiary companies 
has prior claim to assets and earnings of the subsidiaries. 
In consideration of debt ratios, the American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company holds steadfastly to its relatively low 
ratio. Much of their public relations material suggests that 
they do this in realization that public utility status is not 
a guarantee of profit, nor of security for the corporation. A 
brief investigation of the history of General Telephone and 
Electronics suggest that this view is quite prudent . 
General Telephone was organized in 1926. The Associated 
'ralephone Utilities Company acquired the property prior to the 
depression of 1929. Associated Telephone Utilities expanded 
tremendously prior to the depression , paid high prices for 
subsidiary companies it acquired , and had a high debt ratio. 
In the depression of 1929 , it found conditions so difficult 
that in 1932 it had to turn to a New York banking group in 
order to obtain funds to see the company through the depres-
sion . Even this did not suffice , as the depression was long 
lasting. In 1934 the corporation went t hrough 77B of the 
Federal Bankruptcy Act , and was reorganized as the General 
Telephone Corporation of New York. l 
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company , on the 
other hand , weathered the depression quite well , though it did 
not earn its dividend during many of the depression years . 
III . REGULATION AND THE RETURN 
The return on total i nvestment in the telephone industry 
is remarkably low. The return to equity holders is sufficient 
at the present time to hold their investment , and to attract 
new money , in most cases . The advantage , both to the equity 
holder and the rate payer , is through leverage . An example 
can be seen in the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company. 
(See Table XI. ) Their annual report for 1959 shows a return 
of 9.188 per cent on common equity , based on book value . The 
cost of the use of the total investment to the rate payer is 
6. 8 per cent. 





THE PJ\Cll''IC TELE PHONE & T.ra.EGRAPH COMPANY 
•rotal Investment $ 2,690,885, 492 Net Income ~P 
(This total is 
broken down 
as follov1s: ) 
Advances 161,000,000 Cost 
Bonds 830,000,000 Coet 
Preferred 82 1ooo,ooo Cost 
Total $ 1,073,000,000 Cost $ 
Leaving for Connnon: $ 1,517,885,492 Cost $ 





4 1 920 1 000 
36,854 , 746 
139,471,836 
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Zimilar figures, computed for other Bell opel'ating 
companies, will show that some areas are obtaining their 
capital at a lower cost to the rate payer than in Pacific 
Telephone and Tolegraph ' s area. One effect of regulation by 
each state commission, independent of all other state commis-
sions, is that the rate payer in one area is paying more for 
the cost of capital than is the rate payer in another area . 
The cost of capital, however, is not synonomous with the cost 
of ser vice. As the National J\ssocia tion of Public Utility 
Commissioners have indicated, as quoted on page 90, those areas 
in which the return on investment is greatest offer the lowest 
cost of service to the rate payer. The reason, in the main, 
is that prudent long range planning alloVIs an operating company 
to pu1•chase a great deal more plant service capability for the 
same investment. Long range planning is possible only where 
the return on investment is adequate to attract needed new 
investment. 
IV. A CHIT ICAL VIEW OF llEGULA'l1ION 
.Regulation is not done on a basis of "overall cost of 
capital" but on a basis of plant value, computed by various 
means, applioa ble to the particular servlce rendered. rrho 
overall rate of return, net income before fixed charges as 
compared to total capitalization, is not so low as to threaten 
the security of the operating companies or the holding 
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companies today. It does suggest difficulties for the future. 
Some independents have been damaged by a high coat of capital 
concurrent with a need to expand. The holding companies, 
being diversified over a larger area, have not been so 
greatly troubled with the problem. The threat which exists 
in consequence of the lov1 overall rate of return is a threat 
to the future, when low interest rata bonds must be retil .. ed, 
and new money obtained at whatever the going rate of interest 
happens to be . In addition, the depreciation policies, as 
they exist, only replace original oost dollars. The earnings 
of those original cost dollars will not purchase, in future 
years, what they VIOuld in past years. In a recent magazine 
article, Fergus J. McDairmid, a Viae President of the Lincoln 
National Life Insurance Company, commented: 
Six per oent, once looked upon as an aoceptablo return, 
is no longer six per cent . During the last twenty years 
inflation has oost an average loss of four per cent a year, 
based upon the Consumers Price Index. Though the present 
trend is low, 1.3 per cent sin ce Korea, a new administra-
tion brings new changes. Deduct tax in addition, and 
3.5 per cent is about all six per cent really means, versus 
six per cent gross meaning six per cent net in the pre-
World War II yeara . 2 
Insurance companies are an important source of bond 
money for telephone companies. Rather than being eager to 
invest at present bond interest rates, they are coming to 
2Fer~us J. McDairm1d, "What ' s in Store for Public Utility 
Financing? , Public Utilities Fortnightly , November 24, 1960, 




question the effects of inflation. They are limited as to 
what sort of investments they can make, as aroe all institu-
tional investors. These limitations, which are a matter of 
state lav1s in the case of insurance companies , force them to 
select their investments from among those available invest-
ments approved by law for their portfolios. The ability of 
utilities to obtain bond money at low interest rates is 
dependent upon the supply of such money as is available at 
the tlme their need arises. Because the rates on bond money 
are low, and because insurance companies, trust funds, and the 
like, have no other channels of approved investment open to 
them, telephone service is in part being paid for out of the 
low re turn paid those people who receive incomes from fixed 
inter6st sources. 
All of this points to several ills in the present 
regulatory system. This is not a criticism of the actions 
of regulatory groups, but of regulatory pract1.ce, which is the 
result of legislation, precedent, and interpretation. 
The criticisms of questionable practices in regulatory 
processes are not those of the author alone, but are in part 
to be found in recent contributions of.' regulators, utility 
managers, and utility authorities. 
John H. Bickley, a Public Utility Consultant, and 
instructor in Business Administration at Lohigh University, 





"Public utilities should be compared with unregulated busi-
ness enterprise, since the purpose of utility rate regulation 
is to serve as a substitute for competition in unregulated 
business." 3 
Certainly the concept of regulation serving as a 
substitute for competition is a commonly accepted one. Let 
us take Mr . Bickley' s suggestion and compare the telephone 
utilities with unregulated business enterprise. (See Table 
XII. ) 
Comparing these figur0s with the lesser retur n on net 
worth figures which appear in Chapter VIII, Section II, and 
in the appendix, indicates that regulation goes a great deal 
further than merely serving as a substitute for competition. 
The risk to investment in competi tive industry is conceivably 
greate r , however the use of debt cap:t.tal is less than in the 
telephone industry. In 1957, the use of bond capital in 
unregulated industry ran from a low of 6.1 per cent in the 
confectionary industry to a high of 37 per cent in the office 
equipment industry. A survey of 20 industrial fields showed 
that the average debt ratio was 21.8 per oent.4 Utility com-
panies must turn to debt financing to some degree in order to 
increase the 1•eturn to their equity holders so that they are 
able to attract and hold investments in their common stock. 
3Jourdan & Dougal, Investments (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall Company, 1960), p. 351. 





HETUliN ON INVES'l'MEN'r, MANUF1ACTUHING 
YEAR NO. OF COMPAN r£<.:S % RETURN ON NET WOHTH 
1935 1,193 6.7 
1938 1,410 4 . 8 
1940 1,495 10.3 
1945 1 , 406 9 . 1 
1948 1,680 18 . 9 
1950 1,693 17 .1 
1.955 1 ,765 15 . 0 
1958 1,852 9 . 9 
Not earnings of leading manufacturing companies. 
(Figures for 1938 and 1948 were included as they repr e• 
sent the low and high for the 1935-1958 period. 1958 is 
included as it is the last year for which figures are available. ) 
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1l'he degree to which they tu1•n to such financing is limited 
by their estimate of the l'iak to which they are subjecting 
the equity holder and the corporation. 
V. SPl!!CIFIC Al"lliAS 01" CHrl'ICISM 
1fhe criticism of regulatory practice must center on 
two areas. These are, the establishnmnt of the rate base, 
and the computation of a reasonable rate of return on that 
base. Fergus McDairmid has said: 
From my experience in testifying in a number of rate 
cases in various jurisdictions in recent years on matters 
relating to rate of return , I am aware of two principal 
roadblocks to an adequate return for utilities under 
today's conditions. These are, (1 ) original cost as a 
rate base , (2 ) the cost-of·money approach to rate of 
re t urn. Each of these alone is bad enough, but in com-
bination , if followed to their logical conclusions, they 
can produce really devastating results.5 
It is apparent that the original coat concept in 
establishing a rate base in a period of secular inflation such 
as this country has seen in recent decades is destructive of 
the purchasing power value of investment. There is no clari-
fication under law at the present time as to whether or not 
this can be classed as confiscation under the fifth or four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution. The dollar, but not 
the purchasing power value, of the investment is preserved. 
The continuance of the inflation we have known over the past 
20 years will ultimately bring court rulings on this matter, 
5McDa1rmid, ~· ~·• p. 805. 
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and may result i n regulatory commissions, in conjunction wi·tih 
legislative bodies, finding some acceptable subs titute for 
the original cost concept. The Ohio Commission feels they 
have found such an answer in the replacement cost nev1 approach. 
Utility companies favor the concept and they prosper while 
offering rates to utility users which are below the national 
average. The roplacement cost new approach may go too far in 
that it sometimes offers the equity holder an opportunity to 
profit on his investment which exceeds the extent to which he 
is liable to suffer loss. 
CHAl''fEH X 
COMHEN'l'A ftY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This theois does not represent ot•1 tioism oi the I' ot the 
actions of utility manugelllf)nt, or ot the actions of regulatory 
groups.. 'rho lack of such ori t1c1arn 1a not intended by tbe 
author to suggest that roolll for such criticism may not exist. 
It is ra the1• tho aut.hol"' s purpose to examine onv1ronmont; in 
tho caso of the compan1oa, tho economic climate in whioh they 
11 ve. In the case of the regula tory bodies, the legal frame• 
work v11 thin vth1ch they must runotion. 
'l'hoso p1•obloms which beset both mnnagemont and l~egu­
latol•s aro 1.n large measure due to influences whioh 1'all 
outside their control. Comm1ss1onu alone, or utility manage-
mont alone . indeed tho tllo groups i n combination, aro powerless 
to change the existing scheme or things. Their actions, 
coupled with pu~lio support and legislative aot1on aro needod 
11.' changes a1•o to be made. 
Of opeo1:t'1c px•oblomo wh1oh ft!CO the two groups thc1•() is 
muoh to be said. The p:robletn or toll rate diopaJ•itios points 
a nead for some better aystem of ooope~at1on botwoen regula-
tOl'Y g1•oupo or the statoo ond the F'odoral Communications 
Commission. 1teduot1 ons ln inters t.ate rates ha vo lod to 
1noraasoa in intrastate and local sorvioG rates . Tho gain 
l 
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to tho rate payer is almost non-existent. There is a shift 
in cost from those telephone users who aro, in the main, 
users of long distance service , to those v1ho use mostly local 
or intrastate service. 
The inflation of recent decades poses a many faceted 
problem. Depreciation allowances, mostly under five per cent 
on depreciable plant, &Nl inadequate t o robuild or replace 
that plant. The cost of debt money is driven upward as 
institutional investors apply every pressure at their dis~ 
poaal to obtain interest rates which Vlill preserve purchasing 
power value for their investments. 'l'he equity holder becomes 
more and more reluctant to accept the lower return which a 
utility investment offers, where inflation consumes so large 
a portion of that retur n, and where industrial equity securi-
ties continue , year in and year· out, to offer a greater return. 
The longer the record of' good earnings in industrial common 
stocks continues, the less apparent is the risk in such hold-
ings . 
Tho problem of declining employment vii th increasing 
investment in the telephone field is a serious matter, but 
principally a problem for the Federal Government and probably 
common to many industries. It is wise management on the part 
of the telephone companies to follow such a course. The 
ad vantage is to the general public as v1ell as to the il" equity 
holders. 
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'rhe 1•ate base and the rate of return involve a matter 
of inte~minable decisions, year after year, without any 
clear definition as to the underlying purpose. The regula-
tory groups are concerned, under law, with obtaining the 
lowest cost service , along with satisfactol .. Y service quality 
and expansion as needed. One area may offer a low rate base 
e.nd a high rate of re t urn. Another area may offer a high 
rate base and a low rate of return. The Hope Natur•al Gas 
case, in which the Supreme Court ruled that ·the courts were 
not interested in method as long as the total result of the 
commission ruling is not confiscatory, points up the idea 
that the constant struggle to make changes in the method of 
determining the rate base or the rate of return is of little 
importance in the overall picture. It is the author's view 
that what is needed, in consideration of Justice Brandeis ' 
statement that it is "capital embarked in the enterprise" 
which is "devoted to public use," is a concept which preserves 
the purchasing powel"' value of the investment, coupled with a 
rate of return which preserves the purchasing power value of 
equity earnings , adjusted to compensate for the degree of 
risk which the equity holder undergoes. 
The commissions of the various states make disallowances 
from the rate bnse in the case of imprudent investment. Any 
expenses which the commissions feel v1e1"e not necessary to the 
proper conduct of the business are not allov1ed as an expense, 
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hence must come out of the net profit, rather than be 
deducted aa an opor•ating expense. 'l1his is just and pr•ope1•. 
It indicates that there is a penalty for unwise management. 
To a like degree, there should be a reward for wise manage-
ment. Where earnings are based on investment, the same 
earnings are allowed tho inefficient manager as the efficient 
one. The problem of devising a system by which efficient 
management can be measured can only come about through prior 
agreement between regulators and management as to means of 
measurement, and can only bo put into effect through legisla-
tion. A possibility of advantage to the user of telephone 
service, in the long run, is promised in this direction. 
Insofar as the environment ot the telephone industry 
is concerned, the threat is to the future. Low rate bonds 
must be retired at maturity. Depreciation funds must be 
great enough to replace existing plant. The American economy 
cannot afford to have the telephone industry, or any other 
regulated segment of the American economy, stifled in attempts 
to progress. 
In many respects, both the commissions and the companies 
ar•e pointed in the same direction. The commissions s ee the 
need for adequate earnings. 
the lowest possible rates. 
The companies see the need for 
Wide differences of opinion exist, 
but the goal is a common one. As the Committee of Hates of 
111 
the National Assooia tion o1' Hail road and Utility Commissioners 
put it, "You can ' t sink half a boat. 111 If inflation is to 
bo the prevailing condition for America, then regulation must 
take it into account. 
1Full context of quotation appears on pages 89-91. 
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Commonwealth Telephone Company. Annual Heport £.2!: the ~ ~· 
Florida Telephone Col"porat1on. Annual Heport £.2r. the ~ ill£• 
General Waterworks Corporation. ~!!!!.'!!! Report .!:2£. the fu.!:_ 
1959. -
Independent Telephone Company. Annual Hepor t f.2t ~ Xill. ~· 
Intermountain Telephone Company. Annual Heport £..g£ ~ illJ: 
~· 
Orange County Te lephone Company. Annua l Heport !2£. ~ ~ 
1959. -
Southern Nevada Telephone Company. Annual Heport .£.2.£. Jill!_ Y~ 
~· 
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Southern Indiana 'J.'elephone Company. Annual Hepol'•t £.2!: the 
~ llii· 
United Utilities Corporation. Annual Heport £E.!:.~~ 
~· 
West Coast Telephone Company. Annual Report ~ ~ ~ 
~· 
Western Utilities Corporation. Annual rloport ~the~ 
~· 
Anglo Conad:1.an r.relephone Company . Annual Heport for the ~ 
~· 
Associated Telephone and Telegraph Company . Annual Heport 
for the Year 1959. - ---- - .,_,...,_ 
British Columbia r.relephone Company . Annual Report £2..!: 2 
Year 1959 . --
Co~nunity Telephone Company Limited. Annual Report!££ ih! 
Year 1959 . --
Northern Telephone Company Limited . Annua 1 Hepoz•t f.££. ~ 
Year 1959 . --
Northwest Telephone Company . Annual Report .£2.!: 2 ~ lli2.• 
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APPENDIX 
The material contained in this appendix is not neces-
sary to the under•standing of the text, but is of a supplemen·tal 
or substantiating nature. 
APPEUDIX A 
S'l'ATISTICAL DA'l'A ON THE TELEPHONE INDUS'l'RY 
IN Trill UNITED SIJ.Wl'ES - 1959 
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN 'l"HE UNI'rgn S'l1A'l1ES - 1959 
Because the materia l on the following pages was 
compiled from annual reports , certain discrepancies exist . 
These discrepancies are principally due to the use of 
aggregate totals for certain report entries, making 
determina·tion of some of the desired information impossible . 
Where areas are left blank, sufficient information was not 
available from the annual reports used . 
The various columns were computed as follows: 
Gross Assets: This is not 'capitalization' but is the 
t otal of either the assets or liabilities colman of the 
balance sheet . 
Book value of plant, depreciated: This is comparable , 
in a general way, to the rate base . It differes from the 
rate base due t o d:tssa.llowanoes or consideration of 
certain items by the regulatory oommdssions . 
Earnings as a percent of net plant : This is gross 
earnings, before fixed charges, expressed as a percentage 
of the depreciated book value of plant . 
Plant investment per telephone: This is depr~oiated 
book value of plant divided by the number of telephones 
in service . 
Depreciation as a percentage of book value : This is 
not the depreciation rate, but ·the total annual deprec-
iation allowance , expressed as a percentage of the 
depreciated book value of plant . 
Investment per employee : This is the total of book 
value of common and preferred stock, bonds, and advances 
from holding companies where such advances are large 
enough to be of consequence , divided by the number of 
employees . 
M~JOR UTILITY HOLDING COMP~NIES: 
!,. .... 
H u• 
AMERIC~N TELEPHONE & TELEGR~PH COMP~NY 20 0 807 0 001 ts% 
GENER~L TELEPHONE & ELECTRONICS CORP. 10 820,826 o4-4 
~.T. & T. SUBSIDI~RIES: 
BELL .fEL, OF PENNSYLV~NI ~ 
CHESAPEAKE I. POTOMAC TEL, 
CHESAPEAKE & POTCUAC TELo UARI'LAND 
CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TEL. VIRGINIA 
CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TEL. I, VIRGINIA 
DIAUONO STATE TEL, CO, 
I LLI NOI S BEll TEL, CO, 
INDIANA BEll TEL, CO, 
MICHIGAN BELL HL, CO, 
I.IOUNTAI N STATES TEL, CO, 
NEW ENGLAND TEL. & TEL, CO, 
NEW JERSEY BELL TEL. COo 
NEW YORK TEL, COo 
NORTHWESTERN BELL TEL, CO, 
0010 BELL TEL, CO, 
PACIFIC TEL. & TEL, CO, 
SOUTHERN BELL TEL, CO, 
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL, CO, 
WISCONSIN TEL. CO, 
G,T, & Eo SUBSIDIARIES: 
GENERAL TEL, CO. OF CALIFORNIA 
GENERAL TEL, CO, OF FLORIDA 
GENERAL TEL, CO, OF ILLINOIS 
GENERAL TEL, CO. OF INDIANA 
GENERAL TEL, CO, OF I OIA 
GENERAL TEL. CO, OF KENTUCKY 
GENERAL TEL, CO. OF MICHIGAN 
GENERAL TEL, CO. OF MISSOURI 
GENERAL TEL, CO. OF NORTHWEST 
GENERAL TEL. co. OF GilD 
GENERAL TEL, CO. OF PENNSYLVANIA 
GENERAL TEL, CO, OF SOUTHEAST 
GENERAL TEL. CO, OF SOUTHWEST 
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THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRI' OF THE ~ITEO STATES - 1959 
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26,267 2,75 -5,375 
20,510 -
31,o410 3,25 -<1,125 
28,493 
26,505 
35,352 3,0 -4,75 
27,057 2,75 -<1,375 
3 
27. 32e 3, 125-4,875 
26, le6 2,625-4,375 
22,018 2.75 -5,75 
32,o47o4 2.75 -3.e25 
26,1""" 2.75 -<1,5 
24,758 2.75 -4,375 
28, ... 26 
2.75 -5,125 6 

















3.75 -3,875 4,5 -5,5 
2.e75-4,875 4,0 -5,28 
3.0 -<~.e75 4,75-5,5 
3,0 -5,125 
4,25 -5,0 5,5 
3,0 -s.z5 5,o -s,2 
3.0 -3,625 "'·"' -s,.o~ 
3,5 -4,75 6 
3,25 -5,5 "'·e 
3.0 -s.zs ~.~ -s.z 
2.e75-5,0 
3, o -5. 125 5,e 
3.0 -4.75 ~.4 -5.2 
3.25 -s.zs ~.s -s.o 
I 
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY Of THE UNITED STATES- 1959 
MINORITY A.T. ~ T. INTERESTS: 
CINCINNATI ~ SUBURBAN BELL TEL, CO, 
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TEL. CO, 
OTHER UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES: 






































GENERAL IATERWOR~S CORPORATION 


















4,19 0,94 3.21 
UNITED UTILITIES CORPORATION 
IYESTERN UTI Ll Tl ES CORPORATI ON° 
INDEPENDENT COMPANIES AND SUBSIDIARIES 
Of MINOR HOLDING COIIPANIES: 
BETHEL ~ MT, AETNA TEL. CO, 
CALifORNIA INTERSTATE TEL, CO, 
CALifORNIA WATER AND TELEPHONE co.~• 
CAPITAL CITY TEL. CO, 
CAROLINA TEL.~ TEL, COo 
CHILLICOTHE TEL, CO, 
CLIfTON fORGE - WAYNESBORO TEL. CO, 
CCLUMBI A TEL, CO, 
COMMONWEALTH TEL. CO, 
FlORIDA TEL CO,•• 
INTERUOUNTAIN TEL, CO, 
ORANGE COUNTY TEL, CO, 
SOUTHERN INDIANA TEL, CO. 
SOUTHERN NEVADA TEL, CO, 
IL'EST. COAST TEL. CO, 
NORTHWEST TEL, CO,••• 


















































































































•tpLANT INVESTMENT PE,. TELEPHONE TAKEN F'ROU ANNUAL PIEPORTS fit ATHER THAN COMPUTE De 




































































29,8% B!:LL 80,7 6, I 















WEST. UTI L. 
GTE SUBSIOo 
INDEPENDENT 
















































































2.0 -4.5 s.o -6.0 
5,0 



































GHf\PHS , CI-IAHl'~ , AND 'rABLES HEPEHttl!;D TO 






















TREND Of UTILITY STOCK PR ICES 
YEAR END PRJ CES I 960 MONTH END 
~ 
" / 
~ ~ 1-b 
I..., 
/ I "- k 1- ~~--. 
/ -v 
~ 
7 7 1\/ 
I 1/ -v 
I 1.- 1- Vi' I-




v v V' v I I v-1-1-I --
h 
............ 1/ v I; 
'r I 1/ 
1/ \ 7 17 v rf\ [,..-L-J 
I" v _/ 
42 44 <46 <48 50 52 5 <4 5 6 $ 59 f M A M J J A S 0 
0 STANDARD AND POOR I NOEXo 
••Dow JONES INDUSTRIAL INDEXo 
6 GAS Pt PE Lt NES • 
DOW JONES I NDUS TRIAL 




COMP ANIES • 















ACCOUN T! NG 
A TYPI CAL COMM ISSI ON ORGANIZATI ON CHART 
TH E NEW YORK STATE PU BLI C SERVIC E COMM ISSION 
COMM ISSIONERS 
I 1 
OFFICE OF" HEARING 
THE COUNSEL BURE AU 
I f 
GENERAL WATER ACCOUNTING 
ENGI NEERING AND RATES 
BUREAU BUREAU BUREAU 
I 








TRANSPOR TATI ON 
DIVISI ON 
I 






SOURCE: "THE PUBLIC UTILITIES REPORTS GUI DE," PUBLI C OTILITIES REPORTS, INCORPORATED. WASH I NGTON: 1957 











































GROWTH Of THE BEL L SYS TEM 
1895 - 1960 
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25,000 
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300 en w w 
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SOURce:: OwEN ELY, " fi NANC IAL NEVIS AND CoMMENT, " '~ UTILITIES fORTN IGHTLY, 
VoL . 66, No . 9 . OcTOBER 26, 1960. P . 643. 
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Circuit of Montgomery 
County and Supreme 
Superior and Supreme 
Circuit of Pulaski 
County and Supreme 
Supreme 
District 
Superior and Supreme 
Court of Errors 
Superior and Supreme 
u. s. District, Court 
of Appeals and Supr•eme 
Supreme 
Superior Court of 
Fulton County 
Supreme 
Circuit and Supreme 
Circuit and Superior 
and Supreme 
District and Suprema 
District and Supreme 
Circuit of Franklin 



















































District and Supremo 
Supreme Judicial 
Circuit and Court of 
Appeals 
Supreme J·udicial 








Circuit of Hinds County, On commission 
Supreme , and Chance ry record 
Circuit, Court of 
Appeals and Supreme 
District and Supreme 
Supreme 
District and Supreme 
Superior and Supreme 
Appelate Division of 
Superior and Supreme 
District 
Special Term and 
Appelate Division 
of Supreme 
Super• ior and Supreme 



















COUHTS AurHOHIZED TO HEVI EW COMMISSION DECISIONS 
AHEA STATE COU.HT PHOCEDUHE 
Oklahoma Supi•eme Do. 
Or•egon Circuit and Supreme Do. 
Pennsylvania Superio!' Do. 
rlhode Island Supreme Do. 
South Carolina Circuit and Supreme Do . 
South Dakota Circuit and Supreme Do. 
•rennessee Chancery, Appeals and IJo . 
Supreme 
Utah Supl'eme Do . 
Vermont County and Supreme De Novo 
Virginia Supreme Cout•t of' Appeals On commission 
record 
washington Superior, Thurston Do. 
County and Supreme 
West Vir ginia Supreme Court of Appeals Do .. 
Wisconsin Cil•cui t of Dane County, Do . 
and Supt•ame 
Wyoming District of Laramie and Do. 
Supreme 
Source: State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of 
Electric and Ga:3 Utilities - (Federal Power-commis sion) 
Washingtoii"';""'.l954. Pp. 15-16. 
EXTENT OF UTILITY COM1USSION JURISDICTION 





~ ~ < C1l _., 0 
f::1 E-t E-t Cil H NOTES AREA COMMISSIONERS 0 H ~ txt txt Cll !;! - C1l H ...... ~ ;::> 0 z E-t 
8 o= 0 0 '5 ~ 
~ 1::1 ;:a 0 ..... r.il r/l Cll <( 8 0 
Alabama 3 Elec y y y y y y 
Arizona 3 Elec y y y y y y 
Arkansas 3 App y y y y y y 
California 5 App y y y y y y 
Colorado 3 App y y y y y y 
Connecticut 3 App y y y y y y 
Delaware 3 App y y y y y y 
Dist. of Columbia 3 App y y y y y y 
Florida 3 Elec y y N y N N 
Georgia 5 Elec y y y y y y 
Idaho 3 App y y y y y y 
Illinois 5 App y y y y y y 
Indiana 3 App y y y y y y 
Iowa 3 Elec --No power over 
Kansas 3 App y y y y y y telephone Co.s 
Kentucky 3 App y y y y y y 
Louisiana 3 Elec y y LTD y N N· 
Maine 3 App y y y y y N 
Maryland 3 App y y y y y y 
Massachusetts 5 App y y y y y y 
Michigan 3 App y y y y N y 
Minnesota 3 Elec y y N y y N 
Mississippi 3 Ele c y y y y y y 
Missouri 5 App y y y y y y 
Montana 3 Elec y y N y N N 1-l ~ 
~ 
Code: App ~appointive, Elec = elected, Y =Yes, N = No, LTD = Limited 
EXTENT OF u~ILITY COMMISSION JURISDICTI~N 





~ ga C3 H CIJ 
;il 8 ~ ~ H A .REA COWIS.SIONERS 0 /~ r:. NOT~ 
ell H ::::> Cf.l H 
~ > ::::> 0 z 8 
E-4 eo:: 0 0 ~ ::t: ~ r4 ~ 0 
,_, ...... 
{/} (/) < E-1 0 
Neb~aska 3 Elec y Y* y y N N ~~o jurisdiction 
Nevada 3 App y y N y N y within municipal 
New Hampshire 3 App y y y y N y limits 
New Jersey 3 App y y y y y y 
Nev Mexico 3 Elee y y N y y y 
New York 6 App y y y y y y 
North Car olina 5 App y y y y y y 
North Dakota 3 Eleo y y y y y y 
Ohio 3 App y y y y y N 
Oklahoma 3 Elec y y N y N y 
Oregon l App y y !-l y N y 
Pennsylvania 5 App y y y y y y 
Rhode Is land 1 App y y y y y y 
South Car oline 7 Elee y y y y y y 
South Dakota 3 Elec y y N y N N 
Tennessee 3 Elec y y y y N y 
Texas 3 Elec --No power over. 
Ut a h 3 App y y N y N y Telephone Co . s 
Ver mont 3 App y y y y y y 
Vi.rg inia 3 Elec y y y y N y 
Washington 3 App y y y y y N 
v.est Vi r ginia 3 App y y N y y y 
Wisconsin 3 App y y y y y y 
Wyoming 3 App y y N y y y f..$ ~ 
~ 




INDIVIDUAL FLAT RATE RESIDENCE -- SERVICE 
BELL COMPANlES 
.. __ ..... Number ot lines in exchange ~·~---
AREA 10,000 30,000 46,000 60,000 200,000 
Louisiana $3.50 $3.85 $4.25 $ 4.25 $----
Tennessee 3.65 4.70 
Oonneotiout 3.85 4.90 4.90 4.90 5.60 
Michigan 3.86 4.10 4.36 4.35 
Florida 4.10 4.90 4.90 5.65 6.00 
North Carolina 4.20 4.95 4.95 5.10 
Missouri 4.25 4.75 5 .00 
Pennsylvania 4.25 4.75 5.00 5.00 
Ohio 4.40 4.55 4.80 4.80 5.50 
New Jersey 4.40 5.45 6.00 6.oo 6.25 
Georgia 4.40 4.90 4.90 4.90 5. 40 
I llinois 4.50 5.10 5.10 
New York 4,.50 5.00 5.25 5.25 6.00 
Montana 4.50 
South Carolina 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.00 
Kentucky 4.55 5.25 5.25 6.35 
Alabama 4.60 5.10 5.75 
Washington 4.60 5.15 5.15 5.55 6.45 
California 4.65 4.90 5.15 5.60 
Indiana 4.70 5.4o 5.40 5.40 6.26 
Oklahoma 4.70 4~95 5.25 
Minnesota 4.75 
Iowa 4.80 5.50 
Massachusetts 4.90 5.65 5.65 5.65 6.40 
Rhode Island 4.90 5.45 5.45 
Utah 4 .96 5.26 5.55 
North Dakota 4.95 5.70 
Wyoming 4.95 
Virginia s.oo 5.75 6.25 6.25 7,00 
Kansas 5.00 
Colorado 5.05 5.80 5.80 6.20 
Delaware 5.10 5.35 5.60 5.60 
Nebra ska 5 .15 6.20 
Wisconsin 5.20 5 .35 














RATE COMPARI SON (continued) _..;....;.,.;..__.. ....................... 
-----·Number of lines in exchange------
10,000 30,000 45,000 60,000 200,000 
5.45 
5 .. 45 6 .30 
5.50 6.00 6.00 
5.60 s.ao 6 .10 6.10 
5.75 
6.85 6.35 6.35 
6.05 6 .35 s.ao 6.80 
6.25 7.00 7.00 7.00 8.oo 
6.25 6.·75 6.75 6.75 
6.45 6 .'10 6.95 6.95 
6.45 7.45 
6.65 7.40 7.40 
136 
Sources NARUC Compilation of Loeal Service Telephone Rates 
revised Jun~ 50, 1958, for all r ates e~a~pt Michigan 
and Ohio. Michigan rates effective July 1958 and 
Ohio rates effective January l, 1959. 
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TOLL RATE DISPARITIES (IN'l'ERSTATE y_. I NTHA.STATE ) --
PERSOH - ?ERSOM BAX ~ - 3 MINUTES - -
~COMPANIES 
------ - ---Airline distances-·--- - Date Firat 
AH.EA 100 Miles 300 Miles 400 Miles Effective 
Interstate 56¢' t 1.00 $ 1.16 2-1-46 
Alabama 75 1.10 1.16 3-l-50 
Arizona 85 1.20 1.40 3·1-50 
Arkansas 70 1.10 -- 9-21-50 
Calif ornia 70 1.15 1.30 3-21-49 
Colorado 80 1.25 1.56 10-16-47 
Connecticut 60 -- ..... 10-21-47 Delaware 55 -- -- 2-1 ... 46 lt""lorida 70 1.10 1.25 9-1-49 
Georgia 66 1.05 1 .20 7-1 ... 49 
Idaho 75 1.05 1 .35 2-18-50 
Illinois 70 1,15 1.30 10 ... 11•49 
Indiana 60 1,05 -- 10·20-47 IoVJa 70 1.20 12 .. 1·49 
Kansas '"tO 1.15 1.30 7 .. 2-50 
Kentucky 85 1.25 1.40 7-6-50 
Louisiana 80 1.20 5-1-59 
Maine 70 1.05 ...... 9-16·49 
Maryland 65 ..... 3•21-49 
Massaohuse tts 60 ... - 5-26·49 
Michigan 70 1.15 1.30 5-26-49 
Minnesota 70 1.20 1.35 1-1 ... 48 
Mississippi 80 1.20 5-6·49 
Missour i 70 1.10 1.25 7·6•50 
Montana 80 1.25 1.40 4-1 ... 48 
Nebraska 70 1.20 1.35 8-l-49 
Ne vada 70 1.25 1.40 11-26·49 
New.Hampshire 70 ..... 8·7·48 
New Jersey 70 ... 5•1·49 
New Mexico 70 1.20 1.35 6·10-49 
NeVI Yol"k 60 1.05 1 .20 5 ... 14-50 
North Carolina 70 1.10 1.25 5 ... 1 ... 49 
North Dakota 60 1.25 1.55 9-1-36 
Ohio 65 1.10 -- 4•J. .. 49 Oklahoma 70 1.10 1.25 10-19-49 
Oregon 70 1.25 1.40 6•1-49 
Pennsylvania 55 1.00 2-1-46 
(Th i s table oontinued on next po. ge . ) 
158 
~ ~ .;;.D.-IS,_P .... A.-.R,.,.I;.;;T,..I-..E..,_S .. ( o on tin ued } 
AREA 
Hhode Island 











-------~-Airline distances------ Date First 
100 Miles 300 Miles 400 Miles Effective 






































6 .. 1-48 
10-1-50 
1-14-48 
Souroe: Message Toll Ra tes and Disparities, Joint Publication 
of the National Association of Railroad and Utility Oommis• 
sioners and the Federal Communications Commis sion, Washington, 
D. c., 1951, Pp . 100, 312-359. 
Notes: 
The date first effective is shown on these charts t o point out 
that many of these rates are no longer in effect. In some 
oases, more curr ent inf.orma tion was available·, but because 
current information was not available f r om all areas, these 
figures, all of which were in effect at the same time, have 
been used. As is mentioned in the text, the disparity is 
greater at the present time than it was when these rates v1ere 
effective. 
The first ent1~y, "Interstate" is tho rate set by the Federal 
Communications Commission and applies to all areas, whe r e the 
call crosses state lines. All other entries are r ates estab-
lished by the regulating bodies tor the respective states, 
for intrastate calls. 
WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY 











I nves tment 
Return on 




Apparatus & Equipment 





Total, Bell Cus t omers 
u. s . Government: 
Apparatus & Equipment 
Cable and Wires 
Supplies 
Total, u. s. Gov'tc 
Other Non Bell Custoraers: 
Appar atus & Equipment 
Cable and Wires 
Supplies 
Total, Other Non-Bell 
Customers: 
All Customers: 
Apparatus and Equipment 
Ca ble and Wires 
Supplies 
Total, All Customersz 
Other Income Activities: 
Bell 
u. s. Gov•t. 
Other 
Total, Other Income 



























































Sour ce: National Association of Railroad and Utilities 
Commissioner s, Report on Telephone Regula tory 








TESTS OF' REASONABLE.NESS OF RATES 
Cost of Service: What allowance should be made for 
--riuctuatlhg prices and changing cost&? Are standards 
of effici~ncy appropriate? What is a fair ra turn? 
Value 2£_ Servi£!!.: Where a change in ra tea causes a 
change 1n th$ quantit~ of ser vice sold, the value of 
service aoquirea a measure of validity as a teat. 
Character of Service: Ra tas follow servic:re, not service 
follows rates. The utility must provide adequate 
service before asking regulatory agencies for charges 
sufficient to oover the costs of rendering such service. 
Comlal"'ison with other Utilities: Where rates a tte out of 
1 ne with those of siniilar utilities in similar areas, 
the but'den of proof is on the Utility to justify the 
rates. 
Competi t1 v~ Condi tiona: If rates are to be cut to meet 
competition wher e it a~ists, no burden of additional 
cost may be placed upon consumers of non-competitive 
portions of the companyta servi ce. 
Economic Conditions: Depress ions are usually no reason 
for most commissions to allow an increase in domestic 
rates to offset loss of industrial service. Bus iness 
inactivity doesn't jus tify rate reduction in or i ginal 
cost areas , though it may in fair value mreas. During 
inflationary times thEt initiative is with t he companies 
to justify rate increases, eithe r on basis of t he highe r 
cost of capital r epr0duct,ton, OI' increased operating 
expenses. 
Location 2£ Vtiliti= Oost of building and maintaining 
plant var ies with terrain and clima te. These f actor s 
must be cons idered by commiasions. 
Histor,x of Ut~lity: Considers investment or cos t of 
property, eng ineering and construction standards , 
capitalization and cost of capital, past rate policy, 
adequacy of accounting records, policy with respect 
to reserves, policy with respect to e xcess profits 






TESTS OF l~ASONABLENESS OF RATES (continued) 
Corlorate qrganizatiop !n£ Ownership: Commissions more 
o ten are considering ownership, levera ge, pyramiding, 
and intercorpora te contracts in establishing rate 
bases andt rates . of return. 
Rates Forme.r ly in Effectz Rates formerly in effect al~e 
usua!iy judge~as being reasonable to t he utility 
involved. A change in other factors is necessary to 
justify a change in rates. 
Wishes of Patrons: Are of little consequence, except 
that When patrons do not raise objections to proposed 
increases in rates, the possibility of such increase s 
is enhanced. 
Source& Ireton R. BarnQs, Eoonocr1os 2! Public Utility 
Reg~lation (New York:rofts and Company, 1942), 
pp. 296-296. 
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APPENDIX C 
ECONOMIC THEORIES OP REGULATION 
The material pr esented on the following pa ges is 
common to most text books on public util ity economics . It is 
presented here to clarify the meaning of monopoly profit, 
and t he goals of regulation, to the lay-reader . 
With reference to the diagram showing how investment, 
output and rates might be managed f or company benefit, 
maximum profit is at the intersection of the marginal coat 
and marginal revenue curves. Under the conditions shown, 
the area to the left of the intersection of the MC and MR 
curves shows that each additional unit of sales adds more t o 
income than it costs. To the right of this intersection, 
each unit costs more than it adds to re venues. 
The utility would choose to produce Oa units , to be 
sold at a price ab pe r unit. The cost would be ae per unit . 
Total costs would be Oaed. This includes r eturn on capital. 
Monopoly profit would bo debe, and results f r om the ability 
to r estrict output to Oa, or to set price at oc. 
INVESTMENT, OUTPUl' AND RATES ~~NAGED 
FOR UTILITY COMPANY BENEFIT 
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The situation diagramed below does not happen in 
fact. To prevent it happening is the reason for regulation 
of utilities which enjoy a natural monopoly position . 





AR - Average revenue at various outputs. 
MR - Marginal revenue, showing increase in total revenues 
resulting from a unit tncrease in sales . 
AC ~ Average cost per unit tor various volumes of aales . 
MC - Marginal cost. showing increase in costs resulting 
from increase of each unit of output . 
e - Point at which average costs are minimum. (This 
position is dependent upon volume of investment. ) 
~~aximum profit is at the intersection of marginal 
cost and marginal revenue curves . 
INVESr.rMENT OUTPill' AND RATBS MANAGED 
F'OH COMMUNXCI'Y BENEF'rr 
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With re1'erance to the diagram sh()VIing investment, 
output and rates managed for community benefit, both the 
marginal cost curve and the average cost curve shown are 
depenclent upon mo1•e than m~re quantity of investment. Where 
earnings are so low as to make nev1 investment difficult to 
attract) and where regulatory bodies will not allow plant in 
excess of short run needs to be placed in the rate base, the 
long run eff'eot is a greater investment for the same quantity 
of plant, a higher cost of operation, and a higher oos t of 
service . 
The need for regulation can be seen in the diagram 
also. It would be to the utility company's advantage to 
restrict output to Of units. This VIOuld allow Ofgh as the 
cost of providing the service , and Ofbc as the total revenue. 
'I'he monopoly profit would be hgbo. 
INVESTMENT, OUTPUT AND RATES MANAGED 
FOR COMMUNI'rY BENEl!'rr 
One goal of regulation is to create the situation 
diagramed below, allowing cost of capital for the 
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'\ MR 
a X 
MC - :Marginal Cost Curve . 
AC - Average Cost Curve . 
( MC , AC , and AR mus·t all 
intersect at point e . ) 
AR - Average Revenue Curve . 
Oa - Quantity of service provided . 
ae - Prioe per unit of service . 
In order for these curves to intersect at point e , 
it is necessary that plant ·investment; be properly guaged , 
relative to quantity of service used and rates stipulated. 
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